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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the early 1980s, and continuing for nearly three
decades, federal circuit courts unanimously found retail store managers exempt from overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act
1
of 1938 (FLSA). The overwhelming consensus even within the De-

1

29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). For circuit court cases denying store managers’
overtime claims, see Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 502-03
(6th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Va. Oil Co., 69 Fed. App’x 633, 639 (4th Cir. 2003); Murray v.
Stuckey’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 614, 620 (8th Cir. 1991); Donovan v. Burger King Corp. (Burger King II ) , 675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982); Donovan v. Burger King Corp. (Burger
King I ) , 672 F.2d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 1982). In a 1999 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office identified this same trend toward exemption. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-164, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: WHITECOLLAR EXEMPTIONS IN THE MODERN WORK PLACE 4 (1999) (“Our review of federal
case law and [Department of Labor] compliance cases indicated that it is, in fact, difficult to challenge exempt classifications if employees supervise two or more full-time
employees and spend some time—even if minimal—on management tasks.”).
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partment of Labor (DOL) itself—the body responsible for promulgating and enforcing the overtime regulations—was that supervisors
in charge of a free-standing store were highly likely to fall within the
2
exempt category of the statute. However, in 2008 the Eleventh Circuit broke the unanimity by upholding a thirty-six million dollar jury
verdict against Family Dollar for misclassifying its store managers as
3
exempt executives. While the extent to which the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision will affect retail store managers’ status under the FLSA re4
mains unclear, it has undoubtedly resuscitated managers’ hopes
that they can prevail on overtime claims by providing them with circuit precedent on which to stand.
As the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Morgan v. Family Dollar
Stores, Inc., pointedly illustrates, the financial repercussions for large
5
retailers of misclassifying employees can be immense. Tens of millions of dollars hinge on complex judicial determinations of whether
retail supervisors are exempt executives and therefore not owed overtime pay. Getting this determination right has serious implications not
only for businesses but also for workers who stand to lose substantial
wages to which they are statutorily entitled.
To a large extent, the DOL has already performed the interest
balancing between employers and employees through notice-and6
comment rulemaking, with judges determining only the remainder
2

See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that one
DOL attorney “indicated that, although there may be situations in which the exempt
executive classification of an employee supervising two or more workers could be challenged, those situations are very limited”).
3
Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1240, 1258 & n.34 (11th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009).
4
The Eleventh Circuit’s Morgan opinion has failed to convince at least the Fourth
Circuit, which in March 2011 found a Family Dollar store manager exempt as a matter
of law. See In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 518 (4th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Morgan on its facts).
5
Family Dollar is not the only large retailer that has had to dole out millions for
misclassifying its employees. In 2009, for example, a jury found that Staples had willfully misclassified its assistant managers as exempt executives. Stillman v. Staples, Inc.,
No. 07-0849, 2009 WL 1437817, at *2 (D.N.J. May 15, 2009). Staples subsequently
agreed to settle that claim and other pending overtime suits for up to $42 million. Settlement Agreement at 3, In re Staples, Inc. Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., MDL
No. 2025, No. 08-5746 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2010). Radioshack and Starbucks are two other
notable retailers that have reached massive overtime settlements within the last decade,
$29.9 million and $18 million, respectively, with store managers and assistant managers. Lisa Girion, Starbucks Settles Suit on Overtime, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at C1; Radioshack to Pay $29.9 Million to Settle Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at C4.
6
For a selective look at the notice-and-comment process during the DOL’s 2004
revisions of the white collar exemptions, see Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for
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through case-by-case applications of the white collar exemptions.
The regulations that have emerged from the administrative decisionmaking process purportedly strike a compromise between the
7
competing interests of employers and employees. This Comment
argues that the current regulations governing the executive exemption, as well as the circuit case law that has developed around them,
unduly favor the employer and pose a nearly insurmountable obstacle to overtime claims, at least in the context of low-salaried retail supervisors.
I will first discuss the current and former executive-exemption
regulations promulgated by the DOL, as they provide the operating
framework for analyzing FLSA overtime claims. Focusing primarily
on a handful of cases from the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits, I will look at how courts administer the executive
exemption and in particular how they determine whether an employee’s primary duty is management—typically the dispositive inquiry in overtime suits. Appellate courts have almost universally
adopted the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the primary duty test
in Donovan v. Burger King Corp. (Burger King II), which deemed retail
8
supervisors exempt executives as a matter of law. The only crack in
this interpretive monolith appeared with the Eleventh Circuit’s Morgan opinion. Ongoing litigation over whether Dollar General store
managers should be exempt from overtime pay suggests that this
crack could be expanding, although a recent Fourth Circuit opinion
indicates otherwise. Nonetheless, I will show through a series of divergent summary judgment rulings on the exempt status of Dollar
General store managers that judicial interpretations of the primary
duty factors, and not the underlying facts of the cases themselves, are
driving this split on the district level.
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed.
Reg. 22,122, 22,172 (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Defining and Delimiting Exemptions].
7
The DOL’s decision to include an automatic exemption for “highly compensated” employees in the current regulations exemplifies this interest balancing. The
DOL originally proposed exempting employees who earned more than $65,000 a year
from overtime pay. Id. at 22,172. In response, employee groups advocated against a
“highly compensated” cutoff while employer groups advocated for setting the cutoff
even lower. Id. at 22,173. The National Association of Convenience Stores and the
National Retail Federation, for example, recommended setting the cutoff at an annual
salary of $36,000 and $50,000, respectively. Id. at 22,174. Considering the views presented by both employee and employer constituencies, the DOL ultimately set the bar
at $100,000 per year. 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a).
8
See Burger King II, 675 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that Burger
King assistant managers’ primary duties were managerial).
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The divergent summary judgment rulings demonstrate that lowsalaried retail supervisors, like Dollar General store managers, straddle the fence between being exempt from and being entitled to
overtime pay. Not surprisingly, because of the decades of circuit
precedent weighing against store managers’ overtime claims, more
district courts have exempted these managers from overtime pay
than have not. These results, I will argue, would likely be different if
(1) the DOL or the courts reconfigured the primary-duty analysis to
level the playing field between employers and employees and (2) the
executive exemption contained a more vigorous salary-level requirement. Unless the DOL reconsiders the current executive exemption or courts modify their approach to the primary-duty test,
employees whom the FLSA was originally intended to cover will be
denied earnings that they rightfully deserve.
I. THE GOVERNING FRAMEWORK: THE CURRENT AND FORMER
EXECUTIVE EXEMPTION REGULATIONS
Under federal law, overtime claims are governed by the FLSA,
which entitles employees who work over forty hours in a work week
to receive wages at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for
9
any overtime. The Act, though, contains certain white collar exemptions—executive, administrative, and professional—that restrict
10
the categories of employees to whom employers must pay overtime.
The statute grants the Secretary of Labor “broad authority to ‘define
11
and delimit’ the scope” of the exemption. In 1938, the year of the
FLSA’s enactment, the DOL issued its first set of regulations and re12
vised them on multiple occasions throughout the 1940s. Substan13
tial revisions to the exemptions were not made again until 2004.
While some minor changes were made to the executiveexemption regulations in 2004, they have largely remained intact
and unaltered. Unless explicitly noted otherwise, this Comment refers to the pre-2004 regulations for several reasons: (1) the federal
9

29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2006).
Id. § 213(a).
11
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 456 (1997) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)
(1994)); see also Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 613 n.6 (1944)
(noting the Secretary of Labor’s authority to “define and delimit” the “terms” used in
the white collar exemptions).
12
Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 6, at 22,124.
13
See id. (“The major substantive provisions of the Part 541 regulations have remained virtually unchanged for 50 years.”).
10
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circuit case law operates under the old regulations; (2) the Dollar
General cases, for the most part, deal with claims that arose prior to
2004; and (3) courts have noted that their analyses would yield the
same result regardless of whether the pre-2004 or current regula14
tions were applied. I discuss any changes in the regulations that
could potentially impact ongoing and future litigation in Section IV.A.
To qualify as exempt under the white collar regulations, employees must satisfy three criteria: (1) be paid on a salary basis (salary-basis test); (2) earn above a certain minimum salary level per week
15
(salary-level test); and (3) perform certain duties (duties test). The
current regulations require that employees earn a minimum of $455
per week to qualify for the exemption, whereas the former regula16
Under the former regulations,
tions set the minimum at $155.
courts applied two separate duties tests—a “short-duties” test and a
17
“long-duties” test—based upon the employee’s weekly salary level.
If the employee earned less than $250 per week, the long test was
applied and, if the employee earned $250 or more, the short test was
18
used. All cases referenced in this Comment apply the short-duties
19
test, which exempts from overtime pay only those employees who
(1) have management as their primary duty and (2) regularly direct
20
two or more employees.
By and large, the exempt status of retail store managers has
turned on the question of whether they have management as their
14

See, e.g., Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 504 n.5 (6th Cir.
2007) (“Because the current and former regulations are so similar, our resolution of this
case under the former regulations provides guidance to courts performing the ‘primary
duty’ analysis under the current regulations.” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.700 (2007))).
15
29 C.F.R. § 541.100 (2010).
16
Compare id. § 541.100(a)(1) (setting the minimum weekly salary level at $455),
with 29 C.F.R. § 541.117(a) (2003) (amended 2004) (setting the minimum weekly salary level at $155).
17
Compare 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(a)–(e) (2003) (amended 2004) (laying out the longduties test), with id. § 541.1(f) (laying out the short-duties test).
18
Id. § 541.1(f).
19
Before the 2004 revisions, courts rarely applied the long-duties test because of
the outdated salary levels, which even low-salaried retail supervisors generally satisfied.
For a list of the factors considered in this test, see id. § 541.1.
20
Id. § 541.1(f). The current regulations have done away with the two-tiered
short-duties and long-duties test and instead adopt a single standard-duties test for all
employees. The duties an employee must meet to qualify for executive exemption include: (1) having management as her primary duty; (2) regularly directing two or
more employees; and (3) wielding the authority to hire or fire other employees or to
recommend changes to their status which are given “particular weight.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.100(a) (2010).
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“primary duty.” The current regulations define “primary duty” as
the “principal, main, major or most important duty that the em21
ployee performs.” The initial factor usually considered under the
primary-duty analysis is the amount of time the employee spends on
managerial (exempt) versus nonmanagerial (nonexempt) duties, or
22
the “time-allocation prong” of the primary-duty test. The updated
and former regulations provide an illustrative list of managerial duties, which can be divided into two representative categories:
(1) personnel management and (2) business operations. Personnel
management constitutes the bulk of the managerial duties listed and
includes tasks like interviewing and training employees, setting their
23
pay rates and work hours, and generally supervising their work.
Meanwhile, on the business operations side, managerial responsibilities consist of procuring necessary supplies and materials, regulating
24
merchandise flow, and ensuring the safety of employees and clients.
If an employee spends more than fifty percent of her time on
managerial duties, that employee, barring exceptional circums25
tances, has management as her primary duty.
If the employee
spends the majority of her time on nonmanagerial duties, then
26
courts should consider “other pertinent factors.” These nonexclu-

21

29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).
See, e.g., In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2011)
(discussing the time-allocation prong first among the primary-duty factors); Burger King
II, 675 F.2d 516, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing whether Burger King assistant managers spent the majority of their time on managerial duties before examining the other
factors of the primary-duty test).
23
The regulations include the following comprehensive list of personnel management duties:
22

Interviewing, selecting, and training of employees; setting and adjusting their
rates of pay and hours of work; directing their work; maintaining their production or sales records for use in supervision or control; appraising their
productivity and efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or
other changes in their status; handling their complaints and grievances and
disciplining them when necessary; planning the work; determining the techniques to be used; apportioning the work among the workers . . . .
29 C.F.R. § 541.102 (2003) (amended 2004).
24
Id. The updated regulations add two managerial business operations duties to
the list: (1) “planning and controlling the budget” and (2) “monitoring or implementing legal compliance measures.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.102 (2010).
25
I have been unable to find a case in which a retail store manager has argued that she
is not an exempt executive even though she spent over fifty percent of her time on managerial duties, let alone a case that has held for an employee in such a circumstance.
26
29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2003) (amended 2004).
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27

sive factors include: (1) the relative importance of an employee’s
managerial responsibilities as compared to her nonmanagerial duties (relative-importance prong); (2) the regularity with which an
employee exercises discretion in her work (discretionary-powers
prong); (3) the degree of freedom an employee has from supervision (freedom-from-supervision prong); and (4) the relationship between an employee’s salary and the wages paid to other workers
(wage-comparison prong).
II. ONE CIRCUIT VERSUS MANY: NOT ALL RETAIL STORE MANAGERS
H AVE MANAGEMENT AS THEIR PRIMARY DUTY
A. The Legacy of Burger King: Retail Store Managers
Exempt as a Matter of Law?
Circuit and district courts have overwhelmingly upheld retail
28
The
employers’ exempt classifications of frontline supervisors.
prevailing appellate precedent dates from the early 1980s when the
First and Second Circuits rejected the Secretary of Labor’s arguments that Burger King misclassified its assistant managers as exempt, owed them overtime pay, and should have been enjoined
29
from designating them as exempt in the future. The dispute—as in
27

While the regulations permit the consideration of other factors, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.700(a) (2010) (“Factors to consider when determining the primary duty of an
employee include, but are not limited to . . . .” (emphasis added)), courts have limited
their analysis to those factors explicitly outlined by the DOL.
28
Of course, retail store managers are always entitled to challenge these classifications since FLSA exemptions are determined on a case-by-case—factual circumstance
to factual circumstance—basis. See, e.g., Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506
F.3d 496, 503 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (“We do not adopt a rule that any employee who is in
charge of a store has management as her primary duty . . . . [T]he proper analytical
approach is to scrutinize the factors in the Secretary’s regulations, not simply to determine whether the employee was ‘in charge.’”). However, lower-level supervisors are
generally unlikely to succeed on such claims. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 1, at 29-30 (finding that among executive-exemption cases by “lowerincome supervisor[s]” from 1994 to 1998 only one out of twelve supervisors making
$500 or less per week obtained a “favorable ruling”); Peter D. DeChiara, Rethinking the
Managerial-Professional Exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 139,
150 & n.66 (1993) (collecting cases and concluding that “court decisions have made it
clear that frontline supervisors do not enjoy FLSA coverage”).
29
See Burger King II, 675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982); Burger King I, 672 F.2d 221,
226-28 (1st Cir. 1982). A critical fact about the Burger King assistant managers is that
each of them was generally the most senior employee at their restaurants when on duty. While two assistant managers and a store manager worked at the same location,
their schedules rarely overlapped and so each essentially functioned like an independent store operator. Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 517; Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 223.
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nearly all executive-exemption cases—centered on whether the assistant managers earning $250 or more had management as their
30
primary duty. Secretary Shaun Donovan contended that management was not the workers’ primary duty because (1) they spent over
fifty percent of their time on nonmanagerial tasks, and (2) Burger
King’s corporate strictures excessively constrained their ability to ex31
ercise meaningful managerial discretion.
Prior to the Burger King rulings, the DOL had rigidly applied the
time-allocation prong of the executive-exemption regulations and
32
treated it as fairly determinative of an employee’s exempt status. If
an employee spent over fifty percent of her time on nonmanagerial
tasks—such as sweeping the floor and flipping burgers—the DOL
was likely to consider the employee nonexempt and thus eligible for
overtime pay. On the other hand, if a worker dedicated over fifty
percent of her time to managerial duties—such as training, directing, and scheduling employees—that individual would have been ip33
so facto deemed an exempt executive.
The Second Circuit, however, disagreed with the Secretary’s
heavy reliance on the time provision and minimized the provision’s
role in the primary-duty analysis. The court directed the Secretary to
subsequent language in the regulations regarding an employee’s
primary duties: “‘[T]ime alone . . . is not the sole test,’ and . . . an
employee” who spends over fifty percent of her time on nonmanagerial duties “may ‘nevertheless have management as his primary du-

30

Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 520-21; Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 225. In the Burger
King cases, there were two sets of assistant managers—those who earned less than $250
per week and those who earned $250 or more. Applying the long-duties test to those
who earned less than $250 per week, the circuits determined that such managers were
not exempt as a matter of law and were accordingly owed overtime pay because they
had spent forty percent of their time on nonmanagerial duties. Burger King II, 675 F.2d
at 519-20; Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 222-28. Those assistant managers who earned at
least $250 per week had their status under FLSA governed by the short-duties test.
Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 518; Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 225. As such, the assistant
managers could have been exempted from overtime pay if they had “management” as
their primary duty and regularly supervised the work of two or more employees. 29
C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (2003) (amended 2004).
31
Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521-22.
32
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 30 (explaining that the
DOL revised its policy manual after the Burger King decisions to “require that investigators consider percentage limitations as only one factor when assessing the employee’s
primary duty”).
33
See 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (“[I]t may be taken as a good rule of thumb that
primary duty means the major part, or over 50 percent, of the employee’s time.”).
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34

ty if the other pertinent factors support such a conclusion.’” In
other words, the percentage allocation of a supervisor’s time between managerial and nonmanagerial duties offers a “rule of thumb”
or “useful guide” for determining an employee’s primary duty, but
35
the test is in no way dispositive. The Second Circuit made abundantly clear that the time allocation between managerial and nonmanagerial duties constitutes the first—not sole—hurdle an employee must
36
overcome in order to prevail on the primary-duty question.
In minimizing the time element, the Second Circuit thrust the
“other relevant factors”—relative importance of duties, exercise of
discretion, freedom from supervision, and wage comparisons—to
37
the forefront of the primary-duty analysis. The issue of whether
Burger King assistant managers exercised discretion when performing their managerial duties occupied a disproportionate amount of
38
the court’s attention. On the wage-comparison prong, the court
summarily concluded that the assistant managers earned “substantially higher wages” than their coworkers without offering an analyti39
cal framework for future cases. The Second Circuit’s observations
about the relative-importance and freedom-from-supervision factors
were more insightful.
In comparing the relative importance of the assistant managers’ exempt and nonexempt duties, the Second Circuit reached the
conclusion that their managerial duties represented their “princip-

34

Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 154.103 (1981)
(amended 2004)).
35
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.103).
36
The case law abounds with scenarios where a retail store manager post–Burger
King has spent an overwhelming percentage of her time on nonmanagerial duties, yet
has been deemed exempt. For examples, see infra note 87.
37
See Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521 (concluding that “[t]he other ‘pertinent factors’ . . . support [Burger King’s] position” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (1981))). The
First Circuit’s Burger King I opinion does not offer the analytical framework for the
primary-duty analysis that the Second Circuit’s does, which is why most cases cite to the
Second, rather than the First, Circuit’s opinion.
38
Notably, the current regulations have abandoned this prong of the primary-duty
analysis. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a) (2010). For a discussion of the impact this alteration could have on retail supervisors’ efforts to claim overtime pay, see infra text accompanying note 176.
39
Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 522. The Burger King cases are not exceptional in how
they handle the wage-comparison prong of the primary-duty analysis. In fact, courts tend
to treat this factor as an afterthought and give it little, if any, weight when deciding cases.
For more detailed discussion of the wage-comparison prong, see infra subsection IV.C.3.
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40

al responsibilities.” The court defined “principal responsibilities”
as those duties “most important or critical to the success of the res41
taurant.” As evidence that the managerial duties were more important, the court identified the following: (1) the assistant managers’ own testimony; (2) the fact that managerial duties were
more vital to the restaurant’s success; and (3) the managers’ ability
42
to perform exempt and nonexempt work concurrently. Indeed,
the Second Circuit turned the plaintiffs’ own testimony against
them. The managers during the bench trial below had admitted
that they considered their managerial responsibilities more impor43
tant than their nonmanagerial duties.
Second, and arguably most critical, the court tied the relativeimportance inquiry to the store’s business success. In other words,
the proper inquiry asks: are the managerial or nonmanagerial duties more critical to the economic viability of the Burger King restaurants? The Second Circuit found that managerial duties were more
important: “[I]t is clear that the restaurants could not operate successfully unless the managerial functions of Assistant Managers, such
as determining amounts of food to be prepared, running cash
checks, scheduling employees, keeping track of inventory, and as44
signing employees to particular jobs, were performed.” Under this
“success” framework, the answer that managerial duties are more
important seems rather predetermined. As subsequent cases reveal,
that is largely true.
40

Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521. While this Comment devotes substantial space to
the Second Circuit’s treatment of the relative-importance prong, the court itself spent
three sentences on the issue.
41
Id. (emphasis added).
42
Id.
43
Courts since the Burger King cases have often cited deposition testimony by retail
supervisors as support for finding that managerial duties were more important than
nonmanagerial ones. See, e.g., Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011
WL 2200630, at *14 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011) (“Most important, [the store manager’s]
own testimony supports the conclusion that her managerial duties represented the
most important part of her job.”); In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d
631, 641 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (“Most significantly, the store managers’ own testimony demonstrates that their managerial tasks constituted the most important part of their
jobs.”); Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.
Nov. 18, 2010) (pointing to deposition testimony in which the plaintiff described herself as the store’s “leader” and the person “in charge”); Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp,
Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *21 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010) (noting that
the plaintiff testified that she was “‘the one in charge’ at the store” and “that she never
stopped managing her store even when performing nonmanagerial tasks”).
44
Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521.
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To further deemphasize the importance one might attribute to
the significant amounts of time Burger King assistant managers
spent on menial labor, the Second Circuit—in a move subsequently
45
emulated by many courts and now codified in the DOL regula46
tions —ruled that managerial and nonmanagerial duties could be
47
While the Second Circuit did not experformed concurrently.
pound upon its reasoning, one can infer that it did not see the managerial and nonmanagerial duties as entirely separable. The First
Circuit, taking a similar stance in Burger King I, explained that “an
employee can manage while performing other work, and that this
other work does not negate the conclusion that his primary duty
48
is management.” If taken seriously, the Burger King cases stand
for the proposition that managerial duties will almost inevitably,
by their very nature, be more important than nonmanagerial responsibilities.
On the discretionary-powers prong, the Second Circuit refuted
the Secretary’s contention that Burger King’s corporate policies unduly circumscribed the assistant managers’ ability to exercise judg49
ment when managing their stores. The court provided numerous
illustrations of how, even within the constraints imposed by upper
management, the managers exercised discretion, including the
scheduling and directing of employees and the handling of “cash or
50
inventory irregularities.” In explication of its reasoning, the court
offered the following:
We fully recognize that the economic genius of the Burger King enterprise lies in providing uniform products and service economically in
many different locations and that adherence by Assistant Managers to a
remarkably detailed routine is critical to commercial success. The exercise of discretion, however, even where circumscribed by prior in-

45

See infra subsection IV.C.2.
See 29 C.F.R. § 541.106 (2010) (mandating that “[c]oncurent performance of exempt and nonexempt work does not disqualify an employee from the executive exemption if the requirements of § 541.100 are otherwise met”). For further discussion of the
regulatory definition of concurrent duties, see infra text accompanying notes 174-75.
47
The Second Circuit reasoned, “[T]he fact that much of the oversight of the operation can be carried out simultaneously with the performance of non-exempt work”
supported the conclusion that “the principal or most important work of these employees is managerial.” Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521.
48
Burger King I, 672 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1982).
49
Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521-22.
50
Id. at 521. Other examples of areas where the managers exercised discretion
included ordering supplies, dealing with the public, and ensuring that employees were
performing their jobs. Id.
46
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struction, is as critical to that success as adherence to “the book.”
Burger King, of course, seeks to limit likely mistakes in judgment by issuing detailed guidelines, but judgments must still be made. In the
competitive, low margin circumstances of this business, the wrong
number of employees, too many or too few supplies on hand, delays in
service, the preparation of food which must be thrown away, or an underdirected or undersupervised work force all can make the difference
51
between commercial success and failure.

Thus, as interpreted by the First and Second Circuits, the regulations
do not demand that exempt retail supervisors have the ability to exercise unfettered discretion. In fact, executing company-wide oper52
ating procedures suffices.
Alongside its staple analyses of the relative-importance and discretionary-powers prongs, the Second Circuit has heavily influenced
subsequent interpretations of the freedom-from-supervision factor.
The court found that the Burger King assistant managers satisfied
this condition because they were “in charge” of their restaurants and
53
were the “‘boss’ in title and fact.” The assistant managers called the
shots while on duty, and although the managers could reach out to
the lead manager by phone, the Second Circuit did not consider
54
that sufficient supervision to find in their favor. While not stating
so explicitly, the court seemed to interpret the freedom-fromsupervision prong as requiring some type of sustained direct oversight. In other words, unless someone physically oversees and di-

51

Id. at 521-22. The First Circuit reached the same conclusion and found the assistant managers exempt despite Burger King’s “well-defined policies” and the fact that
“tasks [were] spelled out in great detail.” Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 226.
52
When reformulating the executive-exemption test, the DOL initially proposed
that an employer’s “well-defined operating policies or procedures should not by itself
defeat an employee’s exempt status.” Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note
6, at 22,185. The Burger King line of cases certainly influenced this proposed regulation, as it incorporated language from the First Circuit’s opinion. See Burger King I, 672
F.2d at 226 (“The fact that Burger King has well-defined policies, and that tasks are
spelled out in great detail, is insufficient to negate th[e] conclusion” that the assistant
managers had management as their primary duty. (emphasis added)). Perplexingly,
the DOL abandoned the proposed rule change because “it seem[ed] relevant only to
the administrative exemption.” Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 6, at
22,185. While courts have never treated the issue of corporate policies as dispositive of
an employee’s primary duty, it is a factor they consider, particularly under the discretionary-powers prong, and the proposed rule could have potentially influenced the
role such policies played in the analysis. Attributing the rule’s abandonment to “relevancy” seems strange and unsatisfying.
53
Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 522; see also Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 227 (“[T]he person ‘in charge’ of a store has management as his primary duty . . . .”).
54
Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 522.
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rects an employee’s work on a regular basis, that employee will be
considered free from supervision. Such an interpretation, of
course, makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for managers
responsible for the day-to-day operations of free-standing stores to
prevail on this prong. In the end, the Second Circuit found that all
four factors weighed in favor of exempting the managers from
55
overtime pay.
B. In the Wake of Burger King: Circuits Solidify
the Exempt Status of Retail Store Managers
A little less than a decade after the Burger King cases, the Eighth
Circuit, in Murray v. Stuckey’s, Inc., followed the First and Second
Circuits’ lead by finding that Stuckey’s stores—stores that combined
gasoline stations, convenience markets, and restaurants—properly
56
classified their managers as exempt executives. The influence of
the Burger King cases on the Eighth Circuit’s legal reasoning is evident. Even though the store managers claimed to have spent sixtyfive to ninety percent of their time on manual tasks—like pumping
gas, stocking shelves, and waiting on customers—the court largely
57
ignored this purported imbalance between managerial and non58
managerial duties. Instead, it focused on the other relevant factors,
namely whether the store managers exhibited sufficient discretion in
59
their managerial roles and operated free from supervision.
Referencing the Burger King cases, the Eighth Circuit decided
that “the manager of a local store in a modern multi-store organization has management as his or her primary duty even though the
discretion usually associated with management may be limited by the

55

Id. at 522. The Second Circuit rejected the Secretary’s contention that the court
should defer to his interpretation of the regulations and find that the Burger King assistant managers were not exempt executives. Id. The court explained, “If the Secretary believes that the underlying legislation was intended to cover employees such as
Burger King’s Assistant Managers, or that employees doing identical work for an employer should have identical legal status so far as overtime is concerned, he should reconsider the regulations as issued.” Id.
56
939 F.2d 614, 620-21 (8th Cir. 1991).
57
The managerial duties of the store managers highlighted by the court included
hiring and firing workers, “training and supervising store employees, ordering merchandise, handling customer complaints, and safe-guarding cash receipts.” Id. at 618.
58
See id. (“The district court’s finding that the managers spent 65-90 percent of their
time on non-managerial duties . . . is not a controlling factor under the regulations.”).
59
Id. at 619. The Eighth Circuit, somewhat puzzlingly, failed even to mention the
relative-importance or wage-comparison prongs of the primary-duty analysis.
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company’s desire for standardization and uniformity.” While admitting that the managers’ “discretion was circumscribed,” the court
held that they were the “on-site employees ultimately responsible for
61
the stores’ operations” and therefore exempt. The Eighth Circuit
further found that, despite the store managers’ being “actively su62
pervised” by a regional manager, they operated sufficiently free
63
from supervision to merit their exemption from overtime pay.
Some fifteen years later, leaning heavily on the Burger King and
Murray opinions, the Sixth Circuit in Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, reached a similar conclusion, finding the manager of a
64
gas station and convenience store exempt as a matter of law. The
store manager allocated approximately sixty percent of her time to
nonmanagerial tasks—stocking merchandise, sweeping floors, operating the register, etc.—and dedicated the remainder of her
time to managerial duties, such as interviewing and hiring em65
ployees and setting weekly work schedules. The court, though,
found that the other relevant primary-duty factors overwhelmingly
66
favored Speedway.
Borrowing the analytical framework from Burger King II, the
Sixth Circuit assessed the relative importance of managerial and
nonmanagerial duties by looking at which was more critical to the
success of the business and concluded that managerial duties were
67
more important. In an oft-quoted passage, the Sixth Circuit elaborated on its reasoning:
If Thomas failed to perform her nonmanagerial duties, her Speedway
station would still function, albeit much less effectively. . . . If, however,

60

Id. When undertaking the primary-duty analysis, courts frequently cite this
“modern multi-store organization” language. See, e.g., Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Va. Oil Co., 69 Fed. App’x 633,
638 (4th Cir. 2003).
61
Murray, 939 F.2d at 620.
62
Id. at 619. Active supervision in Murray meant that regional managers visited
the store “from time to time” and communicated by phone with the store managers on
a weekly basis. Id.
63
Id. The Eighth Circuit at one point confusingly asserted that, under the DOL
regulations, employers were entitled to have at least one exempt employee at retail
stores like Stuckey’s. See id. at 618 (“The employer is . . . entitled under the FLSA and
the regulations to have one designated exempt executive at this type of facility.”). Neither the former nor the current regulations support such a conclusion.
64
Speedway, 506 F.3d at 509.
65
Id. at 499, 507.
66
Id. at 509.
67
Id. at 505-06.
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Thomas failed to perform her managerial duties, her Speedway station
would not function at all because no one else would perform these essential tasks. Surely, a gas station cannot operate if it has not hired any
employees, has not scheduled any employees to work, or has not
trained its employees on rudimentary procedures such as operating
68
the register.

Following in the footsteps of the Burger King and Murray courts,
the Speedway court also determined that the store managers could
exercise discretion even if corporate dictates considerably circum69
Speedway had deliscribed the ambit of their decisionmaking.
neated “detailed company policies and standardized operating procedures,” which the plaintiff was supposed to follow in fulfilling her
70
managerial duties. The Sixth Circuit nonetheless noted that the
plaintiff had discretion in a number of areas, including evaluating
employees’ performance, deciding what inventory to order during
71
The
high-demand periods, and resolving employee complaints.
court concluded that “[w]hile her discretion was by no means unfettered and abounding, she exercised discretion over important managerial functions on a sufficiently frequent basis to support a find72
ing that management was her primary duty.”
Once again combining the Burger King II and Murray analyses,
the Sixth Circuit restricted the supervision inquiry to “direct over73
the-shoulder oversight on a day-to-day basis.” Although the dis74
trict manager monitored the plaintiff’s job performance, the
court did not consider this monitoring extensive enough to push
75
the freedom-from-supervision prong in her favor. In the end, the
Speedway court found all other relevant primary-duty factors for the
76
employer and summarily rejected the plaintiff’s overtime claim.
68

Id. at 505. For examples of decisions that mimic the Sixth Circuit’s language,
see infra note 161 and accompanying text.
69
Speedway, 506 F.3d at 507-08.
70
Id. at 499.
71
Id. at 507.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 508.
74
The district manager’s monitoring included site visits once or twice a week and
regular communication over the phone and via email. Id. at 507.
75
See id. at 508 (“[D]espite [the district manager’s] involvement and monitoring
. . . , Thomas operated free from direct over-the-shoulder oversight on a day-to-day basis, and we conclude that this relative freedom from supervision was sufficient enough
to support a finding that her primary duty was management.”).
76
See id. at 509 (“Speedway . . . has established that each of the four factors supports its position and, in general, has produced abundant evidence indicating that
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C. Charting a New Course: The Landmark
Family Dollar Class Action
Despite the seemingly insurmountable circuit and district court
precedent awaiting store managers seeking to challenge their classifications as exempt executives, Family Dollar store managers accomplished the unthinkable in 2006 and prevailed on their overtime
claims, securing a jury verdict in excess of $35.5 million, which the
77
Predictably, Family Dollar
Eleventh Circuit subsequently upheld.
evoked the Burger King line of cases in arguing that its store managers
78
were exempt executives as a matter of law. Family Dollar asserted
that because its managers were “in charge” of the store, like the managers in Burger King I and II, Murray, and Speedway, a court could reach
79
The Eleventh Circuit’s reno conclusion other than exemption.
sponse was twofold: (1) the executive-exemption test is highly fact intensive and so it would be improper to limit the analysis to a single
consideration, and (2) the Family Dollar set of facts was “materially
80
dissimilar” to that in the cited cases. In distinguishing the common
facts of the Burger King line of cases, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted
the convergence of three principal differences: (1) the high percentage of nonexempt work Family Dollar store managers performed; (2)
the “severe degree of restriction” corporate policy imposed on manager discretion; and (3) the over-the-shoulder supervision district
81
managers exercised.
What is most striking about the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is its
tone, which contrasts sharply with that in Burger King II and its progeny. When reading the opinion, one is tempted to think that if the
court in Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., had heard the arguments
of Secretary Donovan, the Burger King cases might well have been de-

Thomas’s primary duty was management.”). On the wage-comparison prong, the
court found that the plaintiff earned a salary that was thirty percent greater than those
of the employees under her supervision and concluded that was a “significant
amount.” Id. at 509. For further discussion of this prong, see infra subsection IV.C.3.
77
Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1240, 1285 (11th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009).
78
See id. at 1271 (“Family Dollar cites several cases concluding that managers of a
free-standing store or restaurant were exempt as a matter of law.”). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit devoted an entire subsection to distinguishing Morgan’s facts from those
of Burger King I and II, Murray, and Speedway. Id. at 1271-73.
79
See id. 1271-72 (“Family Dollar insists its store managers were ‘in charge’ of the
store, and therefore, exempt as a matter of law.”).
80
Id. at 1272-73.
81
Id. at 1272.
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cided differently. Although the court attempts to distance its opinion
from those of the other circuits, it clearly makes normative judgments
that conflict with, or at the very least are in tension with, those made
in Burger King I and II, Murray, and Speedway. For instance, the Morgan
court viewed the effects of corporate policy on the primary-duty analysis differently than its sister circuits and placed much greater emphasis
82
on the time-allocation prong.
Notably, the Morgan court was reviewing a denial of a motion for
83
judgment as a matter of law. In other words, so long as “reasonable
and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might
reach different conclusions based on the evidence presented,” then
84
the jury verdict against Family Dollar would be upheld. Given the
standard of review, the Eighth Circuit did not necessarily have to
agree that the jury reached the “right” conclusion, only that there was
sufficient evidence to support whatever outcome it had reached. The
court’s rhetoric, however, powerfully conveyed its belief that the lower
court correctly resolved the issue and thus that the Family Dollar store
85
managers were not properly classified as exempt. Essentially, the
court said that had it been the jury, it likely would have reached the
same result, and that the case wouldn’t have been close.
The importance to the Morgan court’s analysis of the fact that
Family Dollar store managers spent eighty to ninety percent of their
86
time on manual tasks cannot be overstated. Not only had its sister
circuits implicitly rendered the time element irrelevant in their pri87
mary-duty analyses, so too had scores of district courts. While this
82

See infra text accompanying notes 86-88.
551 F.3d at 1247 n.8.
84
Id. at 1248 n.8 (quoting Millennium Partners, L.P. v. Colmar Storage, LLC, 494
F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2007)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (setting forth the
standard for judgment as a matter of law).
85
Perhaps most revealing were the descriptive words that the court used to describe the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. For example, the
court characterized the evidence showing that Family Dollar store managers dedicated
upwards of eighty to ninety percent of their time to nonmanagerial tasks as “overwhelming.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1269. Similarly, the court characterized the evidence
relating to the other relevant factors as “substantial” and thus “support[ive of] the
jury’s verdict” that management was not the managers’ primary duty. Id. at 1270. Lastly, the evidence that the managers’ nonmanagerial functions were more important
than their managerial ones and that they could not operate free from supervision was
“ample,” according to the court. Id.
86
These nonmanagerial duties included “stocking shelves, running the cash registers, unloading trucks, and cleaning the parking lots, floors, and bathrooms.” Id. at 1269.
87
In a 2006 opinion, the Southern District of Florida compiled a number of cases
in which retail store managers were found exempt despite spending disproportionate
83
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essential fact was by no means a lynchpin of the Morgan court’s analysis, it did imbue the court’s assessment of the other relevant factors.
Rather than simply turn to these factors and evaluate them in isolation, as Burger King and its progeny had done, the Eleventh Circuit
88
took a more holistic, totality-of-the-circumstances approach.
For example, under the relative-importance prong, the court
highlighted Family Dollar’s “business model,” observing that the performance of a “large amount of manual labor” by store managers was
89
“a key” to the company’s economic success. As the court’s analysis
typifies, the fact that Family Dollar store managers spent upwards of
ninety percent of their time on nonmanagerial tasks had significance
beyond just the time-allocation prong of the primary-duty test. In particular, it affected the court’s determination of whether Family Dollar
valued store managers’ performance of managerial or nonmanagerial
90
duties more. How store managers allotted time among their various
duties may not matter in isolation, but when considered in conjunction with the other primary-duty factors, it certainly could.
A second critical distinction the Morgan court made was that the
Family Dollar store managers could not simultaneously perform their
91
managerial and nonmanagerial duties. Given that no overlap could
occur between these two sets of duties, the eighty to ninety percent of
managers’ time spent on manual labor consisted solely of nonexempt
92
work. The court based its conclusion on evidence that for store managers “[t]he amount of manual labor overwhelmed their capacity to
93
perform managerial duties concurrently during store hours.” As an
amounts of time completing nonmanagerial tasks. See Posely v. Eckerd Corp., 433 F.
Supp. 2d 1287, 1302-03 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“[T]he case law is replete with decisions holding managers of retail establishments to be exempt, notwithstanding the fact that they
spent the majority of their time performing non-exempt tasks . . . .”); see also Jackson v.
Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (agreeing with the
employer that assistant managers were exempt despite spending ninety percent of their
time on manual work); Moore v. Tractor Supply Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273, 1279
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (finding a store manager exempt who spent ninety-five percent of his
time on nonmanagerial tasks), aff’d per curiam, 140 Fed. App’x 168 (11th Cir. 2005).
88
See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1273 (“[O]ur affirmance of the jury’s verdict . . . is based
on a fact-intensive application of the factors espoused in the regulations, and not on a
categorical approach of whether a particular employee is ‘in charge.’”).
89
Id. at 1270.
90
See id. (“[A]mple evidence supported a finding that the non-managerial tasks
not only consumed 90% of a store manager’s time but were of equal or greater importance to a store’s functioning and success.”).
91
Id. at 1272-73.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 1272.
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example, the court explained, “A store manager unloading a truck and
stocking the storeroom was not concurrently supervising the cashier out
94
front.”
While grounded in the factual record, the inference drawn by the
Eleventh Circuit is starkly at odds with that of Burger King and its ilk in
which the courts more or less assumed that managerial and nonmanagerial duties can be performed simultaneously. For instance, the
First Circuit in Burger King I reasoned that “an employee can manage
while performing other work, and that this other work does not ne95
gate the conclusion that his primary duty is management.”
The
problem with the First Circuit’s approach in practice is how courts are
to separate managerial from nonmanagerial duties. If the Morgan
court had fully embraced the concept of concurrent duties, it might
have found the Family Dollar store managers exempt. But even if
the outcome remained the same, it nonetheless would have made
for a much closer case. Managerial responsibilities, at least in
theory, never cease under the concurrent-duties framework—thus
96
eviscerating the divide between exempt and nonexempt work. Accordingly, the fact that the Morgan court did not find that the Family
Dollar store managers could perform their managerial and nonmanagerial tasks concurrently is significant.
On the relative-importance prong, the Eleventh Circuit in Morgan
found that Family Dollar store managers’ nonmanagerial tasks “were
of equal or greater importance to a store’s functioning and success”
97
than their managerial ones.
Like the Burger King and Speedway
courts, the Morgan court isolated success as the variable that should be

94

Id. at 1273.
672 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1982). To buttress its reasoning, the First Circuit
cited to the DOL regulations which provided an example of an employee who performed both managerial and nonmanagerial functions. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.103 (1981) (amended 2004)) (providing an example of a manager who engages in
sales work while simultaneously performing managerial supervisory tasks). The new regulations contain a separate section entitled “Concurrent Duties.” See 29 C.F.R. § 541.106
(2010) (stating explicitly that a manager can have concurrent duties and still be exempt).
96
For an example of a court that has taken the concept of concurrent duties to its
logical extreme, see In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 515-17 (4th Cir.
2011). The Fourth Circuit stated, “In short, whether the [store manager] was simply
standing around or stocking shelves, she remained responsible for addressing any
problem that could arise and did arise during the course of the daily retail operations.”
Id. For further discussion, see infra subsection IV.C.2.
97
Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1270.
95
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98

used to compare relative importance; however, it reached a much
different conclusion. While noting that the store managers under99
took managerial duties, the court was unconvinced that the performance of those duties was more critical to the store’s success than the
100
nonmanagerial duties —an inference that the Sixth Circuit posited
101
As previously mentioned,
as virtually incontrovertible in Speedway.
the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the sheer amount of manual labor
performed by Family Dollar store managers and how that was “a key”
102
to the company’s “business model.” The court ruled that there was
“ample evidence” to support the jury’s conclusion that the managers’
103
nonexempt duties were more important.
Perhaps the greatest divergence between the Morgan court’s
reasoning and that in Burger King lies in the importance of corporate policies with regard to the discretionary-powers and freedomfrom-supervision prongs. As discussed above, the Burger King opinions posited that highly prescriptive corporate policies were a fact
of modern retail business practices but that employees will almost
104
always be able to exert some discretion within that framework.
The Morgan court drew a line in its opinion and found that Family
Dollar’s manuals and corporate directives “micro-managed” the essential functions of its store managers to the point that no mea105
ningful discretion could be exercised. The court also expounded
on the role of the district manager and how he further circumscribed what limited management responsibilities the Family Dollar
106
In summing up its primary-duty analystore managers did have.

98

See id. (comparing Family Dollar store managers’ managerial and nonmanagerial duties to determine which “were of equal or greater importance to a store’s functioning and success” (emphasis added)).
99
See id. (“Admittedly, the store managers’ job description includes managerial duties.”).
100
See id. (noting that the managers’ job description also included nonmanagerial duties and that these were “essential,” not merely “an incidental part of a managerial job”).
101
See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
102
Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1270.
103
Id.
104
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
105
See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1270 (“The manuals and other corporate directives
micro-managed the days and hours of store operations, the number of key sets for
each store, who may possess the key sets, entire store layouts, the selection, presentation, and pricing of merchandise, promotions, payroll budgets, and staffing levels.”
(emphasis added)).
106
See id. at 1271 (outlining numerous ways in which district managers actively supervised store managers, including “enforcing the detailed store operating policies,”
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sis, the court explained, “[A]mple evidence showed that the combination of sweeping corporate micro-management, close district
manager oversight, and fixed payroll budgets left store managers
little choice in how to manage their stores and with the primary
107
The Morgan
duty of performing manual, not managerial, tasks.”
108
court, in the end, resoundingly affirmed the jury verdict below
and in so doing cracked open the door for future store manager
overtime suits.
III. SHAKING UP THE PRIMARY-DUTY ANALYSIS: MORGAN’S
E FFECT ON DOLLAR G ENERAL STORE
MANAGERS’ OVERTIME SUITS
While the desire to attribute the divergent holdings of Morgan
and its sister courts to “materially dissimilar” facts is tempting, it is
ultimately unconvincing, as emerging Dollar General case law illustrates. Within the past year, numerous district courts have issued
opinions either granting or denying Dollar General’s motions for
summary judgment on the question of whether its store managers
109
were properly classified as exempt executives. Nearly all of these
managers’ claims were initially certified as a class action in the
110
Northern District of Alabama in 2004. After years of preliminary
motions and midway through a 2006 trial on the merits, the judge
overseeing the case decertified the class because the store manag111
The
ers were not “similarly situated with respect to damages.”
claims of individual Dollar General store managers have slowly
been transferred out of the Northern District of Alabama and have
112
begun to make their way through district courts nationwide.
“closely monitor[ing] each store’s weekly payroll,” and “controll[ing] employee hourly
rates and pay raises”).
107
Id.
108
Id. For a discussion of the court’s wage-comparison analysis, see infra subsection IV.C.3.
109
See infra note 113.
110
Brown v. Dologencorp, Inc., No. 02-0673, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 12, 2004)
(order certifying a nationwide class).
111
In re Dollar Gen. Corp. Fair Labor Standards Litig., MDL No. 1635, No. 020673, slip op. at 1-2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2006) (order on motion to decertify).
112
A subsequent class action was filed on August 8, 2006, against Dollar General in
the same court alleging the same FLSA violations and is currently pending. Complaint
at 2, Richter v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 06-1537 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2006). Judge Scott
Coogler of the Northern District of Alabama conditionally certified a nationwide class
on March 23, 2007. Richter, No. 06-1537, slip op. at 11 (Mar. 23, 2007) (order certifying a nationwide class).
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District courts are divided on whether these store managers are
113
exempt executives as a matter of law.
Because the facts in these
cases are not materially dissimilar from one another, I will argue
that it is not the facts, but rather the way in which courts are interpreting the pertinent factors under the primary-duty analysis, that
is causing these divergent outcomes. In other words, the Dollar
General cases demonstrate that, if given identical sets of facts and
told to apply the executive exemption to them, different judges will
reach different outcomes. Some might conclude that Dollar General store managers are exempt as a matter of law, others might
view the cases as fairly evenly divided, and still others may feel
strongly that the managers are not exempt.

113

Eleven district court cases have granted summary judgment to Dollar General.
See Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 2200630, at *1 (D. Neb.
June 3, 2011); Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *10
(W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011); In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d 631, 650
(E.D.N.C. 2011); Brown-Harrison v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0116, slip op. at
17 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2010); Speak v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0124, slip op.
at 1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2010); Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL
4806792, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010); Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No.
09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *1 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010); Hartman v. Dolgencorp
of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2010); Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 WL 1929620, at *1 (D. Utah May 13, 2010); Noble v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0049, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2010); King v. Dolgencorp,
Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 1 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and recommendation of
magistrate judge), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( J un. 17, 2010) (order adopting report and
recommendation of magistrate judge)
Seven district court cases have denied Dollar General’s motions for summary
judgment. Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *20 (N.D.
Iowa June 8, 2011); Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011
WL 1770301, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011); Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079,
09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011); Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc.,
Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010); Kanatzer
v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010);
Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 23,
2010); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *1 (M.D. Ga.
Jan. 11, 2010).
Most of the store managers in these suits worked at Dollar General sometime
between 1999 and 2004, before the current DOL regulations went into effect in August 2004. Several cases, though, concerned employees under the new regulations.
See, e.g., Johnson, 2010 WL 1929620, at *1 (stating that the plaintiff became a store
manager in 2007); King, No. 09-0146, slip op. at 2 (report and recommendation of
magistrate judge) (noting that the plaintiff became assistant store manager in 2005
and store manager in 2006).
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A. What’s the Difference? A Detailed Comparison
of the Facts in the Dollar General Cases
1. A Look at the Role of a Dollar General Store Manager:
Core Managerial and Nonmanagerial Responsibilities
114

A comparison of the Dollar General cases reveals that they share
the same essential facts. The same corporate policies and Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) manual dictated the duties that all the
115
Organizationally, the managers
store managers were to perform.
were overseen by district managers and were the most senior and only
116
salaried employees at their stores. The job descriptions were uniform,
117
outlining the same managerial responsibilities for all store managers.
All managers had the opportunity to receive annual performance bo118
119
nuses, and all were evaluated using the same performance criteria.

114

“Dollar General . . . is a nationwide retail chain of discount, consumable goods,
such as cleaning supplies, health and beauty aids, foods/snacks, housewares, toys, and
basic apparel.” Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *1. Roughly twenty-five percent of these
goods sell for a dollar or less, with the remaining merchandise typically priced below
ten dollars. Id. Dollar General operates over 9600 stores in thirty-five states throughout the country. Store Locations Map, DOLLAR GEN., http://www2.dollargeneral.com/
About-Us/pages/store-locations-map.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). As of October
2011, Dollar General operated no stores within the jurisdiction of the First Circuit and
had only Arizona-based stores within the Ninth Circuit. Id.
115
See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *1 (explaining that Dollar General’s corporate headquarters provided “detailed operating-procedures manuals to every store
manager”); Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *1 (noting that “Dollar General operated its stores according to uniform Standard Operating Procedure manuals”); Roberts,
2010 WL 4806792, at *1 (“All Dollar General stores are operated according to a uniform Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual distributed by Dollar General’s
corporate offices.”).
116
See, e.g., Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301, at *1 (finding that store managers “occupy
the highest level of supervisory authority and are the only employees paid on a salaried
basis” at their store and “report[] to a District Manager”); Johnson, 2010 WL 1929620,
at *1-2 (explaining that the store manager was the “only salaried employee at the
store,” “the boss of the store,” and “reported to a District Manager”).
117
See, e.g., Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301, at *1-2 (compiling essential duties listed in
the Dollar General store manager job description); Plaunt, 2010 WL 5158620, at *2
(listing duties that plaintiff, had, which were the same duties as those listed in Anderson); Mayne-Harrison, 2010 WL 3717604, at *8 (same).
118
See, e.g., Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *1 (stating that “all [Dollar General] store
managers . . . are eligible for a bonus”); Myrick, 2010 WL 146874, at *7 (noting that the
plaintiff store manager had earned several bonuses for her job performance while
working at Dollar General).
119
Dollar General divided these performance criteria into seven categories: sales
volume, safety awareness, loss prevention (or “inventory shrink”), training and development, controllable expenses, customer satisfaction, and merchandising. Aschenbren-
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While the store managers offered varied testimony about the
amount of time spent on nonexempt work—with some claiming they
120
allocated upwards of ninety percent of their time to such duties —all
spent at least a majority of their time performing nonmanagerial tasks
121
like cleaning, stocking shelves, and working the cash register.
Alongside the nonexempt manual labor they performed, Dollar General store managers undertook numerous core managerial responsi122
bilities as provided in the company’s uniform job description. These
responsibilities can be split into two key functional areas: (1) assembling
and supervising store staff and (2) overseeing store operations.
On the staffing side, the store managers recruited, interviewed,
and hired new employees, although they typically could not hire more
senior personnel, like assistant managers, without getting approval
123
from their district managers. Once new employees were hired, store
managers trained and evaluated them, and recommended deserving
124
employees for raises and promotions. Store managers also informed
employees of the expectations regarding their performance, conduct,

ner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *2; accord Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301, at *2; Mayne-Harrison,
2010 WL 3717604, at *21.
120
See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2 (explaining that the plaintiff store manager allegedly spent “only ten percent” of her time on managerial tasks); Kanatzer v.
Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010) (“According to Kanatzer, she spends nearly all of her time—up to 90% of her time—
on . . . manual duties . . . .”); Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at
*3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) (observing that the plaintiff store manager claimed to
have “spent ten percent of her time, about six hours each week, performing management duties”).
121
See, e.g., Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *6
(W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011) (“Leonard spends about 70% of her time on manual labor or
non-management issues.”); Plaunt, 2010 WL 5158620, at *7 (“While it is not clear what
percentage of Plaunt’s time was spent on managerial tasks, we will assume she spent
less than 50% of her time performing purely managerial tasks.”); Johnson, 2010 WL
1929620, at *3 (noting that the plaintiff store manager spent between seventy and
eighty percent of her time on nonmanagerial work).
122
See cases cited supra note 117.
123
See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *15 (commenting that the store manager
“was responsible for taking applications, reviewing applications, interviewing job applicants, checking references, selecting, and hiring certain employees”); Leonard, 2011
WL 2009937, at *2 (finding that the store manager spent roughly five percent of her
work week “reviewing [job] applications, evaluating them and deciding on call backs,
conducting interviews, and finally making a hiring recommendation”).
124
See, e.g., Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *4 (asserting that the store manager was responsible for “training and ongoing development of employees,” as well as
“making recommendations for adjustments to [their] pay rates”); Plaunt, 2010 WL
5158620, at *2 (finding that the plaintiff store manager “trained[,] evaluated[,] and
counseled employees” and “recommended [them] for pay raises and promotions”).
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125

and safety, as well as set staff schedules and assigned work to em126
ployees. While store managers did not have the power to suspend or
fire employees, they could recommend that the district manager do
127
so. On the business operations side, store managers were responsible
for maximizing store profitability by, among other things, keeping the
128
129
shelves stocked with merchandise, reducing inventory loss, and
130
maintaining cash control.
In addition, they oversaw the unloading
131
132
and display of merchandise and dealt with customer complaints.
125

See, e.g., Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL
1770301, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (listing the communication of “performance,
conduct and safety expectations” to employees as an essential job function of the store
manager); King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010)
(report and recommendation of magistrate judge) (noting that the store manager
held regular store meetings “to communicate to employees how to do their job; to discuss ongoing problems in the store; to air grievances; and to announce and explain
new policies”), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( J une 17, 2010) (order adopting report and
recommendation of magistrate judge).
126
See, e.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d 631, 644 (E.D.N.C.
2011) (finding that the store manager “directed the work of her employees by scheduling when they would work and by assigning or delegating daily tasks to them”); Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 8,
2010) (explaining that, while the store manager “schedule[d] employee work shifts”
and “assign[ed] tasks to the other employees at the store,” corporate dictates constrained her discretion in doing so).
127
See, e.g., Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *2
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (“[W]hile authority to terminate employees rested with
the district manager, Roberts . . . made termination recommendations to her district
manager.”); Kanatzer, 2010 WL 2720788, at *1 (mentioning that if an employee seriously misbehaves, then the store manager “must report it to the district manager,
who then takes responsibility for the situation”).
128
See, e.g., Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *4 (listing “directing the flow of
merchandise from the back door delivery to the sales floor” as a job performed by the
store manager); Plaunt, 2010 WL 5158620, at *2 (explaining that the store manager
“facilitated efficient staging, stocking, and storage of merchandise”).
129
See, e.g., Plaunt, 2010 WL 5158620, at *2 (finding that the store manager “evaluated operating statements to identify . . . potential theft” and “maintained accurate
inventory levels by controlling damage [and] markdowns”); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792,
at *3 (explaining that the store manager played a “key role in reducing ‘shrinkage,’ or
avoiding loss” by “ensuring that vendors were honoring their delivery obligations, preventing shoplifting, ensuring that her employees were not stealing, and marking down
damaged merchandise, rather than simply throwing it away”).
130
See, e.g., Leonard v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *3
(W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011) (“Leonard was responsible for proper cash handling procedures at her store and would monitor daily reports showing cashier shortages, voids
and refunds.”); Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301, at *3 (listing “ensuring that cash registers
‘balanced’” as one of the store manager’s duties).
131
See, e.g., Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *4 (explaining that hundreds of boxes of
inventory arrived on “truck day” every week and that the store manager facilitated the
unloading and stocking of merchandise on these days); Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No.
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Standard operating procedures within Dollar General, however,
limited the degree of managerial discretion that the store managers
could exercise. When scheduling employees, store managers had to
133
The
adhere to the weekly labor budget set by district managers.
weekly “truck day”—the day each week when a store’s inventory would
arrive—typically consumed the majority of the labor budget as hun134
dreds of boxes had to be unloaded and unpacked, and then the
135
merchandise stocked or stored.
Store managers could not set the
136
pay rate of their employees, could not hire “key-carrying” person137
nel, such as associate managers and lead clerks, and could not fire
138
subordinates.
Store managers exerted minimal control over the type and quantity of products sold in their stores, as an automated inventory system

09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) (noting that the store
manager was responsible for “unload[ing] supply trucks and plac[ing] merchandise on the store floors”).
132
See, e.g., Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at
*2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (commenting that the store manager “handled customer
complaints if another employee could not resolve” the issue).
133
See, e.g., Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *1 (N.D.
Iowa June 8, 2011) (“District managers strictly control[ed] the number of labor hours
given to each store, and their approval [was] required before a store’s labor budget
[could be] exceeded by the store manager.”); In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766
F. Supp. 2d 631, 635 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (explaining that the district manager “handed
down a labor budget . . . each week”).
134
See, e.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (explaining that “[t]he
store would get one truck delivery per week and would receive about 1200 or more
boxes of merchandise”); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *4 (stating that “[s]tores generally received between 800 and 1200 boxes of merchandise on truck day”).
135
See, e.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (“The majority of the labor budget was spent on truck day and the day after, which did not leave many hours
to schedule for the rest of the week.”); Hale, 2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (describing how
the store manager would “save her staff’s hours for truck day so merchandise could be
placed in the store within twenty-four hours” and how, as a result, the store operated
with a “skeleton crew” for the remainder of the week).
136
See, e.g., Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 2200630, at
*16 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011) (noting that the plaintiff could not “set[] the initial pay
rate of employees”); Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL
5158620, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (same).
137
See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *15 (stating that plaintiff “was not permitted to hire a full-time, key-carrying employee without the district manager’s approval”);
Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *1 (W.D. Ky. May 23,
2011) (reporting that “interview[ing] applicants for ‘key carrier positions’” was the district manager’s duty).
138
See cases cited supra note 127.
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139

handled the bulk of merchandise ordering.
“Plan-O-Grams” dictated where and how to display much, if not all, of a store’s merchan140
Dollar General’s SOP manuals further delineated how store
dise.
managers were to complete certain tasks, such as “how to answer the telephone while also running the cash register, what items should be hung
on a clipboard in the store’s office, how to handle weather emergencies,
141
and what steps should be taken to ensure the floor was clean.”
District managers typically supervised between fifteen to twenty-five
142
store managers at a time and would check up on stores in person
roughly every month and stay anywhere from between several minutes
143
to several hours. District managers also tended to leave daily or week144
ly voicemail messages instructing store managers on certain issues.
2. Weekly Salaries and Bonuses: Some Differences,
but Not Any of Significance
Dollar General store managers’ weekly salaries and annual bonuses
exhibited much greater divergence than did their managerial and nonmanagerial responsibilities and the manner in which their district
managers treated them. Managers’ weekly salaries overwhelmingly

139

See, e.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (explaining that “store merchandise is automatically ordered by Dollar General’s Basic Stock Replenishment System”); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *3 (“[S]tore managers have virtually no control over
the specific merchandise that is sold in the store, and the vast majority of ‘purchasing’ for
the store is done by an automatic system that orders more of a good as it is sold.”).
140
See, e.g., Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604,
at *13 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010) (noting that a “planogram” directs where “most”
merchandise must be placed in the store, with placement of ninety percent of seasonal
products being determined in such a manner by Dollar General’s corporate office);
Hale, 2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (“Typically, ninety percent of Hale’s store was organized
according to the Plan-O-Gram . . . .”).
141
Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *15; accord Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *1.
142
See, e.g., Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL
1770301, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (noting that district managers “over[saw] from
fifteen to twenty-five stores”); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *2 (describing how the
plaintiff’s district manager “generally oversaw between 16-18 stores”).
143
See, e.g., Speak v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0124, slip op. at 13 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 28, 2010) (observing that the district manager visited the plaintiff’s store
about twice a month and that these visits were “typically only a few hours long”); Hale,
2010 WL 2595313, at *4 (explaining that the district manager visited the store manager’s location “once every few months for twenty to thirty minutes”).
144
See, e.g., Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *2 (noting that the district manager left
“regular, often daily,” voicemails for the store manager); Mayne-Harrison, 2010 WL
3717604, at *3 (stating that the store manager received voicemail messages from the
district manager “at least three times a week”).
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fell between $400 and $600, with a range of $313 to $768.
Notably, the store manager earning the most per week ($768) managed to
147
More genovercome Dollar General’s summary judgment motion.
erally, though, the differences in salary are inconsequential because
(1) the salaries for those store managers who prevailed against Dollar
General at the summary judgment phase and those who did not were
148
roughly the same on average, and (2) even if they were not, salaries
are only considered under the wage-comparison prong of the primaryduty test—a prong that the Dollar General courts only marginally con149
sidered and gave little, if any, weight.
Whether and how much store managers received in bonuses constitutes the most variable aspect among Dollar General cases. In some
150
instances, store managers received no bonuses.
In others, they re151
ceived bonuses worth thousands of dollars. Bonuses in and of themselves, however, have no significance. Like store managers’ weekly
salaries, bonuses only enter the primary-duty picture when courts consider the wage-comparison prong.
145

See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2 (explaining that the store manager’s
weekly salary ranged from $440 to $515); Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010
WL 1929620, at *3 (D. Utah May 13, 2010) (noting that the store manager received a
weekly salary of $538.40); King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 27 (M.D.
Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge) (stating that the
store manager earned a weekly salary between $490 and $500 during her tenure with
Dollar General), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( J une 17, 2010) (order adopting report and
recommendation of magistrate judge).
146
See Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
July 8, 2010) (stating that the store manager’s salary was $768 per week); Hale, 2010 WL
2595313, at *3 (noting that the store manager’s weekly salary was $313 at one point).
147
See Kanatzer, 2010 WL 2720788, at *5 (“Viewing Kanatzer’s job as a whole, Dolgencorp has not shown that Kanatzer is exempt.”).
148
The average weekly salary of store managers who prevailed against Dollar General’s summary judgment motions was $489, and their median weekly salary was $464. For
store managers who did not, both the average weekly salary and median weekly salary was
$495. This translates into a $312 average or $1612 median annual salary difference.
These averages and medians incorporated bonuses earned by the store managers.
149
See infra subsection IV.C.3.
150
See, e.g., Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (stating that the store manager “never earned . . . a bonus”); Noble v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0049, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2010)
(explaining that the store manager “was eligible for bonuses throughout her employment but never received one”).
151
See, e.g., Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at
*1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (noting that in 2002 the store manager received a bonus of
$7150.25 to share with store staff); Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL
4806792, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (highlighting that the store manager received bonuses of $7071 and $9271 in 2001 and 2002, respectively).
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Although bonuses did vary, they were spread out rather evenly
among cases where summary judgment was granted and where it was
not. For those store managers whose claims did not survive summary
152
153
judgment, seven received a bonus and two did not, while three
154
cases are unclear as to whether the manager earned a bonus.
For
those managers whose claims survived summary judgment, four re155
156
ceived a bonus and one did not, while courts in two cases made no
157
mention of bonuses. Moreover, the Hartman, King, Roberts, In re Dollar General, and Mayne-Harrison courts, which all granted summary
judgment to Dollar General, did not fully factor whether store man158
All in all,
agers earned a bonus into their primary-duty analyses.
152

See Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 2200630, at *19
(D. Neb. June 3, 2011); Leonard v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937,
at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011); In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d
631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 2011); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *1; Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010); Hartman v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2010); King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 14 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and
recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( J une 17, 2010) (order
adopting report and recommendation of magistrate judge).
153
See Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 WL 1929620, at *1 (D. Utah
May 13, 2010); Noble, No. 09-0049, slip op. at 3.
154
See In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36 (E.D.N.C. 2011); BrownHarrison v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0116, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28,
2010); Speak v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0124, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28,
2010). The In re Dollar General Stores case involved two store managers’ claims. The case
notes that one of these managers received bonuses but says nothing about the other.
155
See Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2 (N.D. Iowa
June 8, 2011); Pierce, 2011 WL 398366, at *1; Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014,
2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 090005, 2010 WL 146874, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2010).
156
See Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010).
157
See Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL
1770301, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011); Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074,
2010 WL 2720788 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010).
158
The Hartman court mentioned that the store manager had received bonuses,
but then did not incorporate that fact into the wage-comparison prong of the primaryduty analysis. Hartman v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009, slip op. at 12 (N.D.
Tex. June 24, 2010). The King court calculated the wage differential between the store
manager and her assistant both with and without bonuses and determined that the difference was significant, even excluding bonuses from the calculation. King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 1, 27-28 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( J une 17, 2010) (order
adopting report and recommendation of magistrate judge). Following the Sixth Circuit in Speedway, the Roberts court decided that it “should estimate weekly hours on the
low end, to compensate for the fact that the plaintiff was eligible for a bonus.” Roberts
v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18,
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bonuses played an insignificant, if not nonexistent, role in the Dollar
General cases.
B. It’s Not About the Facts: It’s About Burger King and Morgan
The ongoing Dollar General litigation pits the contrasting modes
of reasoning displayed in the Burger King cases and Morgan against one
another. A Burger King, Murray, or Speedway quote is likely to be found
in those opinions granting summary judgment to Dollar General,
while Morgan reigns as the supreme authority for those courts denying
summary judgment.
In assessing the relative importance of managerial versus nonmanagerial duties, courts finding Dollar General store managers exempt
as a matter of law determined that the performance of managerial duties was more critical to the success of their store. Some treated the is159
sue summarily, while others explored the relative-importance prong
in greater depth. The Eastern District of North Carolina presented
the most thorough analysis and pointed to the plaintiff’s own testimony, her job description listing oversight responsibilities, her evaluations based on store performance, and her opportunity for bonuses
160
In stating their conclusions, a number of
based on store success.
2010). The plaintiff estimated that she worked between forty-five and eighty hours per
week, so the court calculated her hourly wage based on a fifty-hour work week. Id.
While the Mayne-Harrison and In re Dollar General courts factored bonuses into the
wage-comparison analysis, they determined that the store manager in each case “was
making more, or at least the same, in her management positions as nonexempt employees.” In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 648-49 (quoting Jones v. Va. Oil Co.,
69 Fed. App’x 633, 639 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord
Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *23 (N.D. W. Va.
Sept. 17, 2010). The courts’ statements suggest that it was more the wage-comparison
approach they undertook than the bonuses themselves that drove their conclusions. For
instance, the Morgan court would have found that a manager making the same amount as
a nonexempt employee tilted in favor of finding the manager nonexempt—in other
words, the opposite of what the Mayne-Harrison and In re Dollar General courts found.
159
See, e.g., Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *9 (“In light of . . . the clear language of
Speedway, the court must conclude that the plaintiff’s managerial role was ‘much more
important’ than her non-managerial role.” (quoting Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 505 (6th Cir. 2007))).
160
In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 640-43; see also Mayne-Harrison, 2010
WL 3717604, at *21 (commenting that plaintiff was “the one in charge at the store”);
Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 WL 1929620, at *4 (D. Utah May 13,
2010) (evaluating plaintiff on managerial skills and profitability of store and noting
that she was “ultimately in charge” and “the boss” of the store); King, No. 09-0146, slip
op. at 20-23 (report and recommendation of magistrate judge) (pointing to plaintiff’s
performance review, her testimony, and her job description as evidence that her managerial duties were more important).
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courts borrowed the language used in the Sixth Circuit’s Speedway
opinion; for instance, in King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., the Middle District of
Pennsylvania held: “If [the] plaintiff did not perform her nonmanagerial duties, her Dollar General store may not have functioned well;
but if she did not perform her managerial duties, the store would have
161
been incapable of doing business.”
Meanwhile, those district courts that denied Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment reached the conclusion that reasonable
minds could disagree about whether managerial or nonmanagerial
162
duties were of greater importance. What stood out most prominently to these courts was the overwhelming portion of a store manager’s
163
work day that nonmanagerial duties consumed. Much like the Morgan court, these courts placed great weight on this vast disparity in
time allocation between exempt and nonexempt work. As such, it was
unclear whether store managers’ managerial or nonmanagerial duties
were more important. Several courts also pointed to the fact that
these managers shared many similar responsibilities with the assistant
manager, thus devaluing the significance of these managerial duties in
164
the courts’ eyes.
161

King, No. 09-0146, slip op. at 23 (report and recommendation of magistrate
judge); see also Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *9 (“As in Speedway, if the plaintiff did not
[perform her nonmanagerial tasks,] the performance of the store would certainly be
adversely affected; however, if she did not [do her managerial tasks,] the store would
cease to function at all.”); Mayne-Harrison, 2010 WL 3717604, at *21 (“If MayneHarrison had not performed her nonmanagerial tasks her store may not have performed well; but if she had not performed her managerial functions . . . the store
would not have operated at all.”).
162
See, e.g., Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *14 (N.D.
Iowa June 8, 2011) (finding that Dollar General had “failed to meet [its] burden of
establishing no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Joyner’s managerial duties were more important . . . than her non-managerial duties”); Pierce v.
Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3,
2011) (“A reasonable jury could conclude . . . that Dolgencorp valued Pierce’s manual
labor more highly than her managerial functions.”).
163
See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *14 (“While it is true that Joyner was responsible, as a store manager, for ensuring the store’s profitability, she was also responsible for
performing a substantial amount of the manual labor necessary to ensure its profitability . . . .”); Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 1770301,
at *11 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (finding the “restrictiveness with which Dollar General . . . allot[ted] its labor budget” as “most significant[]” for why summary judgment was
inappropriate on the relative-importance prong of the primary-duty test).
164
See Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at *8
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (“A reasonable jury could, however, also conclude that, given
the fact that Plaunt’s ASM had a similar job description . . . that if Plaunt did not perform her managerial functions the store would have continued to operate, albeit less
efficiently.”); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *5 n.7
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The crux of the disagreement between these district courts, like in
Burger King I and II and Morgan, centers on the discretionary-powers
prong and what effect, if any, corporate policies have on store managers’ ability to exercise managerial discretion. Those courts holding
managers exempt did not find corporate strictures problematic, while
those that rejected Dollar General’s motions did. Among those granting summary judgment, the Roberts court, for example, noted that
“‘stringent’ oversight and ‘detailed company policies and standardized
operating procedures’ are not fatal to the employer’s primary duty ar165
gument.” The court went on to find that the plaintiff had discretion
to run the store on a day-to-day basis and listed a number of areas in
166
In contrast, the court in Kawhich she exercised that discretion.
natzer v. Dolgencorp., Inc., found that the plaintiff’s discretion in managerial duties was “substantially limited by company policies and the
167
Likewise, the district court in Hale v.
oversight of her supervisors.”
Dolgencorp, Inc., determined that a juror could find that the plaintiff
168
exercised only infrequent discretion, while in Myrick v. Dolgencorp,
LLC, the district court noted that the plaintiff did not feel she had
169
discretion to run the store.
IV. A LOPSIDED AFFAIR: REBALANCING AN EXEMPTION
THAT UNDULY FAVORS RETAIL EMPLOYERS
OVER THEIR STORE MANAGERS
As these district court opinions reveal, Dollar General store managers represent a class of workers who fall squarely on the dividing
line between overtime exemption and nonexemption. On the one
hand, these managers undeniably undertook managerial duties, were
evaluated on how well they performed those duties, and could be rewarded with bonuses if their stores met certain performance criteria.
Although limited by corporate policy, these managers were largely responsible for what happened on a day-to-day basis at their stores. District managers kept tabs on what these managers were doing, but only
visited in person from time to time. On the other hand, Dollar Gen(M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2010) (“It should also be noted that many of Myrick’s managerial
tasks were also performed by non-salaried employees.”).
165
Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *9 (quoting Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica,
LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2007)).
166
Id. at *9.
167
No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010).
168
No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *5 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010).
169
2010 WL 146874, at *5.
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eral store managers also spent significant portions of their time performing menial tasks. It is unclear, then, whether the managerial duties or the sheer amount of grunt work expected of these workers was
more critical to the store’s success. Similarly, the discretion exercised
by the store managers could be characterized as severely circumscribed and insignificant. Also, the store managers were arguably not
free from supervision, as the district managers could monitor the
stores’ performance remotely and intervene if necessary.
Despite the compelling case for nonexemption, the governing contours of the executive exemption—initially outlined in Burger King II
and further refined in the updated DOL regulations—overwhelmingly
favor Dollar General. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in In re Family Dollar
170
FLSA Litigation, with which it joined the Burger King II bandwagon,
leaves little doubt that district courts denying summary judgment to
Dollar General stand a sizeable risk of being overturned on appeal.
While technically speaking the legal burden to prove the executive exemption falls on the employer—since the exemption is an affirmative
defense to paying overtime wages—and the exemption is to be narrowly
171
construed, store managers bear the burden of overcoming decades of
appellate precedent denying fellow managers overtime pay.
A. Tightening the Noose on Retail Supervisors’ Overtime Claims:
The Anticipated Effect of the Updated DOL Regulations
Going forward, retail supervisors will also have to surmount the
2004 revisions to the DOL regulations, which, while not altering the
executive exemption significantly, codify circuit case law unfavorable
to overtime claims. The current regulations, for instance, minimize
the importance of the time-allotment prong of the primary-duty analysis. Like the previous regulations, the current ones explain that
“[t]ime alone . . . is not the sole test” but add that “nothing in this section requires that exempt employees spend more than 50 percent of
172
their time performing exempt work.” The updated regulations provide an illustrative example directed at retail supervisors:
170

637 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 2011).
Cf. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (noting in discussing
another FLSA exemption that “[t]o extend an exemption to other than those plainly
and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and
to frustrate the announced will of the people”).
172
29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b) (2010). This section goes on to explain: “Employees
who do not spend more than 50 percent of their time performing exempt duties may
nonetheless meet the primary duty requirement if the other factors support such a
171
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[A]ssistant managers in a retail establishment who perform exempt executive work such as supervising and directing the work of other employees, ordering merchandise, managing the budget and authorizing
payment of bills may have management as their primary duty even if the
assistant managers spend more than 50 percent of the time performing
173
nonexempt work such as running the cash register.

The significance of this additional clause and illustration is to shift the
primary-duty analysis even more overtly to the other pertinent factors
delineated in the regulations.
Drawing heavily on the Burger King cases and in contrast to their
predecessors, the current regulations introduce the idea of “concurrent duties.” The term “concurrent duties” essentially means that an
employee can perform both managerial and nonmanagerial duties
simultaneously, a notion that makes it difficult to separate managerial
from nonmanagerial responsibilities for primary-duty purposes. The
regulations provide, “Generally, exempt executives make the decision
regarding when to perform nonexempt duties and remain responsible
for the success or failure of business operations under their manage174
Similar to the timement while performing the nonexempt work.”
allocation provisions, an example—again directed at retail supervisors—offers insight into how the regulation might be applied:
[A]n assistant manager in a retail establishment may perform work such as
serving customers, cooking food, stocking shelves and cleaning the establishment, but performance of such nonexempt work does not preclude
the exemption if the assistant manager’s primary duty is management. An
assistant manager can supervise employees and serve customers at the
same time without losing the exemption. An exempt employee can also
175
simultaneously direct the work of other employees and stock shelves.

Such a broad understanding of what constitutes concurrent duties
complicates low-level supervisors’ requests for overtime pay.
Perhaps the most significant change to the executive-exemption
test is that the discretionary-powers prong has been dropped from the
primary-duty analysis. As the Morgan opinion and those district court
opinions denying Dollar General summary judgment exemplify, this
conclusion.” Id. The former regulations, by contrast, provided: “Time alone . . . is not
the sole test, and in situations where the employee does not spend over 50 percent of
his time in managerial duties, he might nevertheless have management as his primary
duty if the other pertinent factors support such a conclusion.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.103
(2003) (amended 2004).
173
29 C.F.R. § 541.700(c) (2010).
174
Id. § 541.106(a).
175
Id. § 541.106(b).
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prong offered courts significant leeway in how to interpret the facts at
hand. Some courts—most notably the Eleventh Circuit—have already
decided to fold the issue of discretion into the freedom-from176
supervision prong. Still, the removal of this factor from those listed
in the regulations makes it equally, if not more, likely that, going forward, discretion will play less and less of a role in determining an employee’s primary duty. Such a change will make it that much harder
for retail supervisors to prevail on their overtime claims.
B. Moving Beyond Burger King: The Call for a More
Dynamic Primary-Duty Inquiry
While the forecast for Dollar General–type store managers’ overtime suits looks gloomy, especially after the Fourth Circuit’s In re Fami177
ly Dollar ruling, it is important to remember that the DOL regulations call for a case-by-case application of the executive exemption
and that the outcome in a particular case ultimately hinges on an
individual judge’s weighing of the primary-duty factors. The DOL
regulations and prevailing circuit precedent undoubtedly tilt the balance in favor of employers and exemption and seriously circumscribe

176

The Eleventh Circuit in Morgan explicitly took this position: “Having discretionary power is one aspect of freedom from supervision.” Morgan v. Family Dollar
Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1270 n.57 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009).
The court highlighted that the current regulations require a primary-duty determination “to be made ‘with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a
whole.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a) (2006)). The court concluded that “the
new regulations do not preclude, and are consistent with, our consideration of the frequency with which an employee exercises discretionary powers in our primary duty
analysis.” Id.; see also Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *9
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (noting that while the new regulations omit the discretionary-powers prong, “issues of manager authority and control remain centrally relevant”
to the primary-duty analysis).
177
An opinion coming after In re Family Dollar—by the same Western District of
Virginia judge who denied Dollar General’s summary judgment motion in Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc.—portends the negative impact the Fourth Circuit’s opinion will have on
overtime claims. In reviewing the proposed settlement agreements between Hale and
other store managers with Dollar General, the judge noted that the settlement
amounts were “significantly less than the amount of back wages and liquidated damages claimed” and that the “claims, if believed by a jury, might reasonably result in a verdict for the plaintiff[s].” Taylor v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0002, 2011 WL 1626557, at
*1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011). While the judge pointed to his Hale opinion to demonstrate the legitimacy of the plaintiffs’ overtime claims, he also conceded that the
Fourth Circuit’s In re Family Dollar opinion “on similar facts” had “substantially undercut [his] decision.” Id. Were the judge confronted with another Dollar General case,
his analysis would likely differ from that in Hale and the outcome very well could be
summary dismissal of the manager’s claims.
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the ambit of lower courts’ judicial interpretation. Though taut, the
noose around low-level retail supervisors’ overtime claims has not entirely strangled judges’ ability to construe the primary-duty factors in a
way that levels the playing field between employer and employee. For
instance, in individual cases, courts must resolve a series of interpretative questions: How should the relative importance of managerial and
nonmanagerial duties be determined? How significantly, if at all, do
detailed corporate policies curtail managerial discretion? How great
must the difference be between managers’ wages and those of subordinates for the wage-comparison prong to weigh in favor of exemption? And, in the end, how should all of these factors be balanced? Are
there any that should be given more weight than others? The way in
which district judges analyze and measure these considerations can make
the difference between store managers’ being found exempt as a matter
178
of law and getting an opportunity to put their cases before a jury.
One would imagine that district courts in circuits that have definitively pronounced on these questions in favor of exemption, like the
First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, would adhere to the
appellate courts’ interpretative approach. At least in the ongoing Dol179
lar General litigation, that has not always been the case.
District
courts in both the Second and Eighth Circuits have denied Dollar General’s summary judgment motions despite the Burger King II and Murray
precedents, respectively, that seemingly settled how the primary-duty
180
The Northern District of New York in Ananalysis should be done.
178

At least in the Dollar General cases, it is more accurate to say getting an opportunity to negotiate a favorable settlement. Nearly all of the store managers who survived
summary judgment have settled with Dollar General. See infra note 226.
179
Thus far, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have leaned heavily on the Speedway
opinion and used it as their controlling precedent when conducting the primary-duty
analysis. See Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *1 (W.D. Ky.
May 23, 2011) (“Recently, in Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, the Sixth Circuit set out a
clear roadmap for determining [whether a Dollar General store manager’s primary duty
is management]. The Court will follow this roadmap, noting that the facts in Speedway
SuperAmerica are quite similar to those here.” (citation omitted)); Roberts, 2010 WL
4806792, at *6 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (discussing the split among courts regarding Dollar General store managers’ FLSA-exemption status, but finding the issue “squarely controlled by the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Speedway”). Not surprisingly, both the Leonard and Roberts courts found the Dollar General store managers exempt as a matter of
law. Leonard, 2011 WL 2009937, at *10; Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *11.
180
See Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *12, *14, *1618 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2011) (determining that material factual disputes existed on all
primary-duty prongs); Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363,
2011 WL 1770301, at *10-12 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (finding disputed questions of fact
on the time-allocation, relative-importance, and wage-differential prongs of the
primary-duty test); Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *5
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derson v. Dolgencorp of New York, Inc., did not defer even slightly to the
Second Circuit’s Burger King II opinion and referred to it only fleeting181
In Kaly in a citation outlining the executive exemption standard.
natzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., the Eastern District of Missouri treated the
Eighth Circuit’s Murray opinion similarly—ignoring it entirely except
for a brief mention in a footnote explaining that Dollar General had
182
cited the case in its brief.
Burger King II and Murray are clearly the most relevant, if not controlling, precedents in those circuits on how to interpret the primaryduty factors as they relate to retail supervisors like Dollar General
store managers. Perhaps the decisions by the Anderson and Kanatzer
courts to disregard these circuit opinions were an unconscious one,
but that seems unlikely. Rather, these decisions are better viewed as a
silent indictment of the Burger King line of cases, which have over the
years transformed an individualized executive-exemption inquiry into
a legal conclusion that all retail supervisors are exempt as a matter of
law. Granted, no circuit has formally issued such a sweeping proclamation because to do so would contravene the case-by-case approach required by the DOL regulations. Nonetheless, the body of work speaks
for itself, as circuits have found fast food restaurant assistant managers,
the managers of small gasoline and convenience stores, and the super183
visors of low-end discount retailers all exempt as a matter of law.
Given the supervisors’ low-salary levels—a fact which tends to favor
nonexemption—it is unclear when, if ever, retail managers could pre-

(E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010) (concluding that material disputes of fact existed on all primary-duty prongs). But see Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 WL
2200630, at *14 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011) (finding no factual issues upon which reasonable minds could disagree and thus granting summary judgment to Dollar General).
181
Anderson, 2011 WL 177031, at *7.
182
Kanatzer, 2010 WL 2720788, at *5 n.5. Two other district courts in the Eighth
Circuit have ruled on Dollar General summary judgment motions since Kanatzer. See
Jones, 2011 WL 2261480; Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630. These courts referenced Murray more frequently than Kanatzer, but neither found Murray dispositive of the primaryduty inquiry as applied to retail store managers. In fact, at various points throughout its
opinion, the Jones court explicitly distinguished the Dollar General facts from the Murray
precedent. See Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *16 (“I recognize that under Eighth Circuit . . . precedent in Murray . . . , Joyner need not have ‘ultimate’ authority for all managerial decision in order to be exempt from the FLSA. Nonetheless, I still find that a significant question of material fact exists concerning whether Dollar General’s policies
prevented Joyner from frequently exercising discretion ‘day-to-day’ . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting Murray v. Stuckey’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 614, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1991))).
183
See, e.g., In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 518 (discount retailers); Burgar King II,
675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982) (fast food restaurants); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (gasoline stores).
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vail on overtime claims under the Burger King II framework. Once a
court begins to travel down the Burger King II path, the outcome of
overtime exemption is inevitable. Regardless of the individual set of
facts, managerial duties will necessarily be more vital than nonmanagerial duties, and discretion can still be exhibited even if corporate
policies are highly controlling. Thus, as interpreted in Burger King II,
the relative-importance, freedom-from-supervision, and discretionarypowers prongs of the primary-duty inquiry will always favor exempting
retail supervisors as a matter of law. The time-allocation prong is not
dispositive and simply shifts the analysis to the other pertinent factors,
while the wage-differential prong is largely irrelevant. Considering that
exemption turns on the primary-duty analysis and that the Burger King
line of cases resolves all of the critical factors in favor of the employer,
courts cannot help but reach the legal conclusion of exemption under
the Burger King II framework.
Along with other district courts that have denied Dollar General’s
motions for summary judgment, the Anderson and Kanatzer courts implicitly recognized that the rigid Burger King II framework was not sufficiently dynamic to account for the factual complexities of the Dollar
General litigation. While disclaiming its attempt to counter the Burger
King II framework, the Eleventh Circuit in Morgan still put forth alternative interpretations of the relative-importance and discretionary184
Managerial duties will
powers prongs of the primary-duty analysis.
not always be more valuable than nonmanagerial ones and corporate
policies, if overly prescriptive, can suffocate any meaningful managerial discretion. Equally as important, the Eleventh Circuit reinserted
the element of time into the primary-duty equation in a substantive way
185
by allowing it to affect the analysis of other relevant factors.
Due to managers’ difficulty in securing overtime pay under Burger
King II’s framework and the severe imbalance it creates between employers and employees as a result, the DOL and courts should begin
to dismantle this paradigm. A test more responsive to various sets of
fact patterns that will ensure greater parity between these competing
interest groups should replace it. Reimagining the executive exemption will not be easy, but opinions like Morgan have begun to lay the
groundwork. Since the DOL revisions to the executive exemption are
so recent, it remains highly improbable that the regulatory piece of the

184

Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009).
185
Id. at 1269-70.
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puzzle will be modified anytime soon. With that reality in mind, courts
should recast the primary-duty inquiry—to the extent that the DOL
regulations and circuit precedent allow—so as to equalize the overtime
playing field between employer and employee.
In the following section, I suggest several ways this could be accomplished. Following Morgan’s lead, courts should give more weight
to the division of an employee’s time between managerial and nonmanagerial duties by integrating it into the overall assessment of the
relative-importance prong. I propose a sliding-scale approach whereby the more time an employee spends on nonmanagerial duties, the
more evidence an employer must submit to prove that it actually considered the managerial responsibilities more important despite the
significant time-allocation gap suggesting otherwise. Practically, for
this proposal to work, courts will also have to cabin the notion of concurrent duties; if not, it will be impossible to separate managerial from
nonmanagerial functions. This does not mean jettisoning concurrent
duties entirely, as they are codified in the DOL regulations; rather, it
means circumscribing their ambit as greatly as possible so that they do
not distort the relative-importance analysis. Furthermore, the wagecomparison prong, currently a nonfactor, should also play a much
more prominent role in the primary-duty inquiry.
While courts can do much to realign the balance between employers and employees, the DOL wields the ultimate rebalancing power through its rulemaking authority. The larger issue, which courts do
not have the authority to rectify, is that the primary-duty analysis has
for decades operated as the lynchpin of the executive exemption. As I
will argue in Section IV.D, an employee’s weekly salary level serves as a
much better proxy for whether someone should be exempt from overtime pay than the primary-duty test. However, given the paltry salarylevel requirement both before and after the 2004 revisions, this element excludes few, if any, low-salaried retail store managers from the
executive exemption. The DOL should institute a more vigorous salary-level requirement and update it regularly to reflect changing economic conditions.
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C. Revitalizing the Relative-Importance and Wage-Differential
Prongs of the Primary-Duty Analysis
1. Making Time Count: The Sliding Scale Approach
to the Relative-Importance Prong
The time-allotment prong of the primary-duty analysis—both as
codified in the DOL regulations and as interpreted by circuit courts—
serves no discernible purpose. Practically speaking, if this prong were
removed from courts’ application of the primary-duty test, case outcomes would not change. The only potential function of this prong is
that it signals to courts when they should look to the other relevant
primary-duty factors. If employees spend the majority of their time on
nonexempt work, then management might not be their primary duty,
and so it is necessary to look at the substance of their employment responsibilities. On the other hand, if employees spend the majority of
their time on exempt work, then management by definition is their
primary duty, and it is not necessary to look beyond the timeallocation prong. In practice, though, employees only bring overtime
claims when they spend as much—or typically far more—time on
nonexempt work. Given this reality, courts treat the time-allocation
prong in a perfunctory fashion—summarily mentioning it before moving on to the other relevant factors.
Time should reenter the primary-duty analysis in a meaningful
way by linking it to the relative-importance prong. Spending ninety
percent of one’s time on nonexempt work versus fifty percent, for example, is not a trivial fact. Intuitively, an employee who spends ninety
percent of her time on nonexempt work is much less likely to have
management as her primary duty than someone who splits her time
evenly between menial and managerial tasks. Yet the current executive exemption, at least as applied by the overwhelming majority of
appellate courts, fails to take into account this critical distinction.
From Burger King I to In re Family Dollar, courts have entirely divorced
the allocation of an employee’s time from the other relevant factors
and thus prevented it from bearing substantively on case dispositions.
The error of this divorce can be seen most powerfully in the relative-importance prong. Circuits have almost universally reached the
conclusion that managerial activities are more important to the success
of a business than the performance of nonexempt work. Assuming that
an employee divides her time equally between exempt and nonexempt
work, it is hard to disagree with this assessment. In these situations, if
an employer had to choose whether it wanted the exempt or non-
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exempt work performed, it would likely choose the exempt work, as
nonperformance of exempt work would probably affect the successful
operation of the business more so than that of nonexempt work.
However, the more time an employee spends on nonexempt
work in relation to exempt work, the less tenable the position staked
out by these circuits becomes. For instance, which becomes more
important when an employee spends twenty percent of her time on
managerial duties and eighty percent on menial work? Would an
employer really value the managerial duties over the nonexempt
work in that case? Stated differently, which is more important to the
success of the business? The response might depend on the specific
managerial tasks involved, but it is not immediately clear that the answer would be exempt work.
Given the contextual nature of the inquiry, courts should not
compare the importance of managerial versus nonmanagerial duties
without also considering how much time an employee devotes to
each. Either the DOL, through revised regulations, or courts, within
the existing regulatory framework, could operationalize the interplay
between the time-allotment and relative-importance prongs of the
primary-duty analysis by adopting a sliding-scale approach. If an employee’s time is split relatively evenly between exempt and nonexempt
work, then the relative-importance prong favors the employer, and
the employee will have to put forth evidence to rebut the resulting
presumption. As the amount of time dedicated to nonexempt work increases, the less the relative-importance prong favors the employer and
the more it begins to favor the employee. If the percentage of time
spent on nonexempt work exceeds seventy percent, say, the employer
must convince the court that the exempt work is more important.
2. Limiting the Ambit of Concurrent Duties
Perhaps the most far-reaching and perplexing innovation of Burger King II is the notion of concurrent duties, which the DOL codified
186
in its updated regulations. The underlying premise is a sound one:
exempt and nonexempt work can be performed simultaneously. The
examples provided by the DOL in the regulations—as when an employee serves customers or stocks shelves while directing others’
187
work —demonstrate the concept.

186
187

29 C.F.R. § 541.106 (2010).
Id. § 541.106(b); see also supra text accompanying note 175.
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Difficulty arises only when courts must separate exempt from
nonexempt work for primary-duty purposes. If taken to their logical
extreme, concurrent duties would swallow any meaningful distinction
between exempt and nonexempt work. Theoretically, any menial task
can be performed while supervising others. If something as solitary as
stocking shelves can be considered a duty concurrent with management, then it is unclear what nonexempt task would fall outside of the
concurrent-duties ambit.
The Fourth Circuit in In re Family Dollar takes concurrent duties to
their logical extreme and in so doing illustrates how they can distort
the primary-duty analysis. The court first determined that the Family
Dollar store manager could both perform menial tasks and operate
188
the store at the same time. To demonstrate how the store manager
was able to multitask, the court pulled statements from her deposition
testimony. The manager herself, according to the court, admitted
that she was “responsible for making sure the whole store ran successfully” regardless of whether she “happened to be putting up stock at a
189
given moment or running a register or talking to a customer.” While
the store manager claimed to have spent ninety-nine percent of her
190
time performing nonexempt work, the court found that these nonmanagerial tasks could not be separated from her ever-present mana191
gerial duties as the store’s manager. As such, the court held that the
store manager “was performing management duties whenever she was
in the store, even though she also devoted most of her time to doing
192
the mundane physical activities necessary for its successful operation.”
The implication of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling is that regardless of
the actual amount of time retail store managers spend on nonexempt
tasks, they are always “responsibl[e] to see that the store operate[s]
successfully and profitably” and thus are always concurrently perform193
ing managerial duties.
In making the scope of concurrent duties
boundless, the Fourth Circuit eroded any principled distinction between exempt and nonexempt duties and eviscerated the sliding-scale
188

See In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 515-16 (“[W]hile [the store manager] performed nonmanagerial tasks around the store as she determined necessary, she concurrently performed the managerial duties of running the store.”).
189
Id. at 516.
190
Id. at 514.
191
See id. at 516 (concluding that the store manager performed nonmanagerial
functions “in the context of her overall responsibility to see that the store operated
successfully and profitably”).
192
Id. at 517.
193
Id. at 516.
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approach to the relative-importance prong proposed in subsection
IV.C.1. The importance of concurrent duties within the court’s opinion cannot be overstated, as it frames the court’s analysis of the other
194
While not problematic on its face, this apprimary-duty factors.
proach essentially renders these other factors irrelevant and transforms concurrent duties into the dispositive issue. When conducting
the primary-duty analysis courts should accordingly cabin the notion
of concurrent duties as much as possible.
3. Putting the Wage-Comparison Prong to Work
a. The Hourly-Wage Versus Lump-Sum Salary Approach
195

The wage-comparison prong takes the prize for being the least
developed and most underutilized factor when courts assess a retail
196
store manager’s primary duty. This prong essentially requires courts
to compare the store manager’s earnings to the wages of the em197
Alployees whom she supervises, namely assistant store managers.
though some disagreement exists among district courts as to whether
a store manager’s salary should be measured against other employees’

194

The court spent eight rather sizeable paragraphs discussing concurrent duties
and then four on the other relevant factors. See id. at 515-18. In introducing its analysis of the latter four factors, the court explained: “With respect to the second, third, and
fourth factors for determining whether management was [the store manager’s] primary
duty, the facts discussed with respect to the first factor satisfy these factors also.” Id. at 517.
195
The executive-exemption regulations provide that courts, when undertaking
the primary-duty analysis, should consider “the relationship between the employee’s
salary and the wages paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a) (2010). The previous regulations
employed essentially the same language. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2003) (amended
2004) (providing that in performing the primary-duty inquiry courts should assess “the
relationship between his [the supervisor’s] salary and the wages paid other employees
for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the supervisor” (emphasis added)).
196
See, e.g., Murray v. Stuckey’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 1991) (listing the
wage-comparison prong among the primary duty factors but failing to consider it);
Burger King II, 675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that, relative to employees
doing exclusively non-exempt work, the Burger King assistant managers “were paid
substantially higher wages even taking their longer hours into account”); Burger King I,
672 F.2d 221, 225-26 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding that some of the primary duty factors
“quite clearly cut in favor of” exemption, notably “a comparison of wages with other
employees,” but providing no analysis as to why).
197
See, e.g., In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 517 (explaining that courts are to
“look to the relationship between the store manager’s salary and nonexempt employees’ wages”).
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198

weekly or hourly pay, circuit courts have unanimously adopted the
199
hourly-wage comparison approach.
Without question, courts should compare wages on an hourly basis, as opposed to employing a weekly lump-sum salary approach. The
purpose of the primary-duty inquiry’s wage-comparison prong is not
to determine whether the store manager received greater compensation overall than other employees, but whether she earned more per
200
If the store manager only makes more than
unit of time worked.
198

Compare Moore v. Tractor Supply Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1278-79 (S.D. Fla.
2004) (comparing the store manager’s weekly salary to that earned by other employees
without accounting for the difference in number of hours worked), aff’d per curiam,
140 Fed. App’x 168 (11th Cir. 2005), with Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 604 F. Supp.
2d 903, 923 (E.D. La. 2009) (comparing the assistant store manager’s salary to that
earned by subordinates on an hourly basis). Only three of the eighteen Dollar General
courts declined to convert a store manager’s weekly salary into an hourly rate of pay.
See Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *9 (W.D. Ky. May
23, 2011) (refusing to adopt an hourly-wage comparison approach because the managers’ “hours reflect her greater responsibility and provide her the opportunity to earn
more”); Hartman v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Tex.
June 24, 2010) (“Although Plaintiff attempts to divide her weekly salary by alleged
hours worked, courts have disregarded this attempt and focused instead on the weekly
amount of pay.”); Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 WL 1929620, at *6 (D.
Utah May 13, 2010) (contending that the store manager’s “argument” that her salary
should be converted into an hourly rate “collapses on itself” because she “was not confined to work a certain number of hours”).
Rather than converting the store manager’s salary into an hourly rate, the Hale
court converted other employees’ wages into a weekly salary based on the alleged
number of hours that the store manager worked and then compared that figure with
the store manager’s weekly salary. Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 2010 WL
2595313, at *6 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010). Per the FLSA’s mandate, the court calculated
the employees’ wages at time and a half their regular pay rate for any time worked over
the forty-hour work week. Id. While novel and intriguing, the court’s approach to the
wage-comparison prong assumes incorrectly that these other employees would have to
put in more than forty hours per week to do the same amount of work as the store
manager. Dollar General could instead hire part-time help at the same pay rate as
these employees or schedule store clerks whose hours otherwise would fall below forty
hours per week for more time.
199
See In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 517-18 (converting the store manager’s salary
into an hourly wage and comparing it to the hourly wages of other employees); Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008) (same), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 50809 (6th Cir. 2007) (same).
200
The Plaunt court, which denied Dollar General’s summary judgment motion,
captures this reasoning most powerfully:
We find that converting [the store manager’s] weekly salary into an effective
hourly wage is most appropriate in order to find a common basis with which
to compare the wages paid to others. To ignore the fact that Plaunt worked
more than forty hours per week would largely frustrate the purpose of this inquiry: to determine whether the employer sought to subvert the FLSA by at-
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other employees because she works longer hours, she is not being
compensated for her management skills. Rather, she is simply getting
paid for the sheer amount of work done. In other words, evidence
that the hourly wages of the store manager and the other employees
are roughly equal tilts heavily against the contention that the manager’s primary duty is management. If her primary duty were management, then she should be compensated accordingly.
b. The Quandary of Bonuses
Courts have disagreed about whether to consider bonuses within
the wage-comparison prong, and if so, how to analyze them. Courts’
approaches with regard to bonuses can be divided into four catego201
ries: (1) ignore bonuses entirely; (2) compare managers’ opportunity for bonuses or bonuses actually awarded with that of other em202
ployees; (3) count managers’ ability to earn bonuses as a plus factor
203
for overtime exemption; and (4) combine bonuses earned with
204
managers’ salaries.
While none of these approaches predominates
in the Dollar General summary judgment rulings, most courts at least
acknowledge that bonuses should be factored into the wagecomparison analysis.
Many courts examine bonuses independently of weekly salaries.
Some courts electing this approach compare actual bonuses earned by
store managers to those earned by fellow workers, while others compare the two groups’ bonus-earning potential. Under either method,
taching an overtime exemption to an employee who otherwise performs the
same non-exempt tasks as hourly employees.
Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at *13 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 14, 2010); see also Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL
398366, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (employing verbatim Plaunt’s rationale).
201
See, e.g., Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2, *17-18
(N.D. Iowa June 8, 2011) (stating in the fact section that the store manager earned a
bonus but failing to consider this bonus award in the wage-comparison prong); Pierce,
2011 WL 398366, at *1, *11-12 (same); King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op.
at 14, 27-28 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge)
(same), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( J un. 17, 2010) (order adopting report and recommendation of magistrate judge).
202
See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
203
See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
204
See, e.g., Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604,
at *23 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010) (commenting that the store manager’s “salary was
not the totality of [her] compensation” and adding bonuses earned to her annual salary); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *7 n.12 (M.D. Ga.
Jan. 11, 2010) (factoring the store manager’s bonuses into her salary when undertaking the wage-comparison analysis).
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if the manager earned more or could potentially earn more in bonuses than other employees, the wage-comparison prong would tilt in favor of exemption. For instance, in Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., the Western
District of Virginia found that “the bonus paid to Hale weigh[ed]
against a finding that Hale’s salary was similar, or close to, the salary of
an hourly worker because Hale earned a ten percent bonus based
upon the store’s profit while the remainder of the profit was prorated
205
among lower-paid employees.” Likewise, the District of Nebraska determined in Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., that the store manager’s
opportunity to earn a “bonus was more than three times larger than her
[assistant store manager’s] bonus and five times larger than the bonus
pool split by all store clerks. As such, a reasonable jury could only conclude that Aschenbrenner was earning substantially more as a store
206
manager than other, nonexempt employees.”
Other courts that analyze bonuses independently of weekly salaries count managers’ ability to earn bonuses as a plus factor for overtime exemption. For example, the Fourth Circuit in In re Family Dollar
developed the notion of a “profit center,” which considers “whether
the manager had the ability to influence the amount of her compen207
sation.”
The court found that the Family Dollar store manager’s
bonus “depended on her store’s profitability” and thus that the store
208
operated as a “profit center.” The fact that the store manager could

205

No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *6 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010); see also In re
Dollar Gen. FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d 631, 648-49 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (finding that the
store manager “received a larger bonus than the other employees” and that this fact
pushed the wage-comparison prong toward exemption).
206
No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 2200630, at *19 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011). But see Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 1770301, at *13
(N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (acknowledging that the store manager was “eligible for a larger bonus” than the assistant manager but that this “bonus eligibility, while relevant,
does not . . . conclusively tip the scales in favor of summary judgment”).
207
637 F.3d 508, 517 (4th Cir. 2011). The Western District of Kentucky in a Dollar
General summary judgment ruling picked up on the Fourth Circuit’s “profit center”
concept. See Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *9 (W.D.
Ky. May 23, 2011) (“The structure of [the store manager’s] compensation—that is, the
substantial bonus opportunity—further reflects her central role in the store as a profit
center. All of the discretion, authority and leadership she exercised was viewed as contributing to store performance. As such, she was paid accordingly.” (emphasis added)). Somewhat perplexingly, the Leonard court did not attribute its use of “profit center” to the Fourth Circuit.
208
In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 517.
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influence the store’s profitability, and, as a result, the amount in bonus209
es she earned, pointed toward management as her primary duty.
While bonuses should be considered in the wage-comparison
analysis, they should not be analyzed independently of managers’ salaries. Comparing bonuses in isolation provides little insight into
whether the store manager earned substantially more on the whole
than her subordinates. Only when combined with a manager’s salary
do bonuses acquire significance. As such, courts should add bonuses
to managers’ annual salaries and then compute an hourly wage rate.
This way the wage-comparison prong will take into account a manager’s overall annual compensation.
c. What Pay Differentials Are Significant?
Even though most courts employ the hourly wage-comparison approach, and to some extent incorporate bonuses into the inquiry,
there are serious disagreements as to how significant the pay differential must be to find that a store manager’s primary duty is management. On one end of the spectrum, the Morgan court found that a
two- to three-dollar-per-hour pay differential (i.e., a thirty-one percent
pay gap) between Family Dollar store managers and their assistant
210
managers constituted “a relatively small difference” in hourly rates.
On the other end, the Speedway court determined that an “approximately thirty percent” pay gap between the store manager and subor211
dinate employees “equated to a significant amount.” District courts
in the Dollar General cases have similarly disagreed about what pay
212
gaps are significant.
209

Id. at 517-18. Alongside its “profit center” analysis, the Fourth Circuit examined whether the Family Dollar store manager “earned more, in absolute terms,
than nonmanagerial employees.” Id. at 517. Here, the court not only compared the
hourly wage rate of the manager and other employees but also the actual bonuses
earned by the two groups. Id.
210
Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1257-58, 1271 (11th Cir.
2008). The court did not state this percentage explicitly. But if one subtracts the
hourly wage of the assistant store managers ($7.60) from the store managers’ ($9.99)
and divides by the assistant store managers’ wage rate ($7.60), the result is approximately thirty-one percent.
211
Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
212
Compare, e.g., Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *7
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2010) (finding that the store manager “made, at most, $2.85 more
per hour” than her assistant managers—a 40.7% pay differential—and that, in light of
Morgan, this difference was not significant), with Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 090005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (“The plaintiff’s ‘hourly’
salary was between 20 and 36 percent higher than the next highest paid non-salary
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The fundamental dilemma is that the DOL has failed to provide
guidance on how courts are to use the wage-comparison prong, and
more specifically, what constitutes a significant gap in pay. Courts
understandably divide on the issue of whether a two-to-three dollar
pay gap is significant. Such a small hourly differential may not seem
like much, but over the course of a year it can add up to a sizeable
amount. Most Dollar General store managers claimed to have worked
213
at least fifty hours per week, with many asserting that they worked
214
sixty hours or more. A two-dollar hourly differential translates into
an annual difference of $5200 and $6240 for a fifty- and sixty-hour
work week, respectively, while the same calculations at a three-dollar
hourly pay gap yield $7800 and $9360 more for a store manager over a
fifty-two week period.
Several courts in the Dollar General cases have held that so long
as store managers make “more, or at least the same,” as assistant managers, then the wage-comparison prong weighs in favor of exemp215
tion.
If that were the case, then this prong would always support a
finding that the store manager had management as her primary duty.
Slight differences in pay, as discussed previously, surely point toward
the contrary conclusion that the manager should be nonexempt. Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop a principled cutoff
for when the pay differential favors, or does not favor, exemption,
small differences in pay call into question whether a manager’s primary duty is in fact management. Differences of a dollar or less certainly
favor nonexemption. Differences between one or two dollars, though
closer, favor nonexemption as well, while two-to-three dollar differences could potentially go either way. The key, in the end, is that

employee, not to mention other ‘subordinate employees.’ Under Speedway, this calculus supports the defendant’s primary duty argument.”).
213
See, e.g., Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at
*1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (finding that “[o]n average” the store manager “worked
fifty hours per week”); Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at
*2 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010) (noting that until 2005 the store manager “worked fifty
hours per week”).
214
See, e.g., Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *2
(W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011) (explaining that the store manager “worked between 60 and
80 hours per week”); Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *3
(W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) (finding that the store manager “averaged between sixty to
seventy hours of work per week”).
215
Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *23
(N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010); accord In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp.
2d 631, 649 (E.D.N.C. 2011).
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courts should inject more vigor into the wage-comparison prong and
actually make it count in the primary-duty analysis.
D. Taking the Executive Exemption’s Salary-Level
Requirement More Seriously
Operating in the background of cases like those in the Dollar
General litigation is the normative question of who merits FLSA overtime protection and why the white collar exemptions even exist.
While neither the FLSA nor its legislative history provides a rationale for
216
the white collar exemptions, scholars have offered a number of explanations—from the exempted workers’ social status to the indivisibility of
the work they perform. L. Camille Hebert offers a helpful summary of
these explanations:
The theory behind the [white collar] exemptions . . . has been that these
employees do not need the protections of the overtime requirements
because of their higher base pay and their greater job security. In addition, to the extent that the overtime provisions were intended to cause
employers to create more jobs by hiring more workers to perform the
additional work, it appears that this option is less feasible in connection
with the type of work performed by these categories of employees. Finally, the value to the employer of the work of executive, administrative, or
professional employees is thought to be generally unrelated to the number of hours worked by those employees, so that they are neither paid
more for working more hours a week nor paid less for working less hours
217
in a given week.

Leading up to the 2004 revisions, scholars advocated for overhauling
218
the exemptions in light of the modern service-oriented economy.
As Hebert explains,

216

See, e.g., Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 6, at 22,123-25 (describing the history of and the comments made on the exemption rules, but stopping
short of providing a rationale); Regan C. Rowan, Comment, Solving the Bluish Collar
Problem: An Analysis of the DOL’s Modernization of the Exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 119, 124 (2004) (“The legislative history of the FLSA contains no explanation for the white collar exemptions.”).
217
L. Camille Hebert, “Updating” the “White-Collar” Employee Exemptions to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 56-57 (2003).
218
See, e.g., DeChiara, supra note 28, at 187 (suggesting comp time as an alternative to overtime pay for overworked executives); Michael A. Faillace, Automatic Exemption of Highly-Paid Employees and Other Proposed Amendments to the White-Collar Exemptions:
Bringing the Fair Labor Standards Act into the 21st Century, 15 LAB. LAW. 357, 360 (2000)
(“[T]he requirements of the exemption tests under the FLSA are no longer applicable
to modern working conditions, and . . . should [be] reform[ed] . . . substantially in
order to respond to the legitimate needs of today’s employees and employers.”).
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These exemptions appear to have been shaped with a relatively small
group of high-level management and administrative personnel and recognized professions in mind, but over the years the exemptions have
been applied to a larger group of employees, many of whom do not receive the relatively high salaries thought to justify not providing extra
219
compensation for hours worked over the traditional maximum.

The DOL regulations support the notion that these white collar
exemptions were only intended to cover a certain subset of workers—
namely those who earned above a threshold salary level. Ever since
the initial regulations were passed in 1938, the regulations have ensured that only employees earning above a certain amount may qualify
for the executive exemption. For the latter part of the twentieth cen220
tury, the floor for exemption was set at a weekly salary of $155 and
221
revised upwards to $455 in 2004.
The correlation between a worker’s salary and the executive ex222
emption makes intuitive sense.
Salaries are generally correlated
with the level of skills—gained through education, experience, training, etc.—that a worker has to offer. Those with a greater skill set are
more likely to earn a higher salary and therefore are in less need of
FLSA overtime protection. Thus, the less skilled the worker, the lower
the salary, and the more FLSA overtime protection might be warranted.
The level of pay for Dollar General store managers is critical in assessing whether they should be treated as exempt executives. Had the
much-delayed increase in the threshold salary from $155 to $455 occurred several years earlier, many of these store managers would not
have reached the requisite level and would have been barred from ex223
Similarly, even those who met the $455 cutoff did not
emption.
219

Hebert, supra note 217, at 118 (footnotes omitted).
29 C.F.R. § 541.117(a) (2003) (amended 2004).
221
29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(1) (2010).
222
This correlation is also borne out in the DOL’s early and later experience with
the test. See Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 6, at 22,173 (“The experience of the Divisions has shown that in the categories of employees under consideration the higher the salaries paid the more likely the employees are to meet all the requirements for exemption.” (quoting HARRY WEISS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS AND REGULATIONS, PART 541, at 22-23
(1949))); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 31 (“DOL said that salary remains a good indicator of the degree of importance attached to a particular employee’s job, which provides a practical guide, particularly in borderline cases, for distinguishing bona fide [white collar] employees from those who were not intended by
the Congress to come within the categories of this exemption.”).
223
See Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2 (N.D. Iowa
June 8, 2011) (stating that the store manager earned a weekly salary of $440 in April
2001); Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 1770301,
220
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earn much more than the minimum wage. Store managers on average in the Dollar General cases worked 60 hours and earned $492 per
week, resulting in an hourly wage rate of $8.20—only about a dollar
224
more than the current minimum wage of $7.25.
The DOL should either update the insufficient salary-level cutoff or
consider an approach similar to that in California, where workers’ sala225
ries must be twice the minimum wage to qualify for the exemption.
Given that Dollar General’s store managers do not earn significantly
more on a per-hour basis than those earning the minimum wage, exempting these managers from overtime pay surely contravenes the spirit
of the FLSA. Because of the regulations’ paltry salary-level test, these
retail supervisors’ low economic position is not being adequately factored into the executive-exemption equation.
CONCLUSION
As Morgan and numerous Dollar General cases reveal, retail store
226
managers can prevail on their FLSA overtime claims, but it is not an
at *3, *6 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (noting that one of the store managers involved in the
suit “was paid a fixed weekly salary of $425,” while the other manager initially earned
$423 per week); Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at
*1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (stating that Pierce received weekly salaries of $355.77 and
$423.08 in June 2001 and April 2002, respectively); In re Dollar Gen. FLSA Litig., 766 F.
Supp. 2d 631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (explaining that the store manager earned a weekly
salary of $385 in 2001); Speak v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0124, slip op. at 2
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2010) (noting that in September 2001 the store manger received a
$450 weekly salary); Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 08-0084, 2010 WL
5158620, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (reporting that the plaintiff initially earned
$425 per week); Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (stating that the plaintiff made $420 per week in her first
year); Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *2 (N.D.
W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010) (reporting that Mayne-Harrison made $370 and $423 per week
in 2001 and 2002, respectively); Hartman v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009, slip
op. at 2 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2010) (pointing out that the store manager earned between $375 and $435 from 2000 until 2003); Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014,
2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) (stating that Hale’s salary ranged
from $313 to $431 per week while she managed the store); Noble v. Dolgencorp, Inc.,
No. 09-0049, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2010) (reporting that the plaintiff initially
made approximately $425 per week).
224
29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (Supp. III 2010).
225
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(f) (2002) (requiring an exempt
employee to “earn a monthly salary equivalent to no less than two (2) times the state
minimum wage for full-time employment”); see also Faillace, supra note 218, at 387
(proposing that “all employees earning less than two times the minimum wage be
classified as non-exempt”).
226
While denying summary judgment for Dollar General did not end those cases,
it was a significant burden to overcome and has resulted in favorable outcomes for
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easily accomplished feat and will only become more challenging under the amended DOL regulations. The executive exemption, in its
current formulation, does not adequately account for frontline supervisors whose low-level salaries do not support their exemption from
overtime pay. Courts should work on revitalizing the time-allocation,
relative-importance, and wage-comparison prongs of the primary-duty
inquiry in an effort to reel in the undue advantages currently afforded
employers. Meanwhile, the DOL should make the salary-level requirement a more vigorous component of the executive exemption so
that only those workers whose salaries justify exemption will be denied
overtime wages.
Even with a heightened salary-level requirement and a more overtime-friendly primary-duty inquiry, many retail store managers, especially those charged with greater managerial duties and who earn a
higher salary, will still be found exempt. This is how an exemption
that strikes an appropriate balance between employers and employees
should work—not all will be exempt and not all will be entitled to
overtime pay. Thousands of retail supervisors’ overtime claims hang
in the balance. It is time for the courts and the DOL to get to work.

plaintiffs. Dollar General has settled with the store managers in Pierce, Plaunt, Hale,
and Myrick. See Pierce, No. 09-0097, slip op. at 1 (May 26, 2011) (order approving individual settlement); Plaunt, No. 09-0084, slip op. at 1 (May 26, 2010) (order approving
individual settlement); Hale, 2010 WL 4261310, at *1-2 (Oct. 28, 2010) (order approving the filing of settlement under seal); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005 (M.D.
Ga. Feb. 19, 2010) (order of dismissal) (indicating that the action has been settled).
In Jones, one of the plaintiffs has reached a settlement agreement with Dollar General. See No. 10-3020, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 31, 2011) (order approving settlement).
Another plaintiff motioned for dismissal so that she could become a party in Richter
v. Dolgencorp, Inc. See Joint Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1, Kanatzer
v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074 (E.D. Mo. July 26, 2010). As of October 2011, Anderson remains open.

